THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Bishop of Birmingham and his Critics.

Dr. Barnes, whose appointment to the See of Birmingham has given unfeigned gratification to many liberally-minded Churchmen and Nonconformists, has been ever since his consecration, we regret to observe, the subject of persistent attacks by the *Church Times*. In the address delivered at his enthronement, the Bishop took occasion to tell his hearers that:

> 'They must guard against the introduction into their churches of . . . the pagan sacramentalism which had entered into Latin Catholicism and pretended that they could create the Bread of Salvation by some magic of ritual and formula.'

It is not surprising that the Bishop views with serious apprehension the way in which the palsied hand of superstition, far more dangerous to true religion than materialistic secularism, is laying hold of the English Church, and particularly of the clergy. Our episcopate of late years has been so deeply affected by dread of Agnosticism, Materialism, Pantheism, Spiritualism, Modernism, that it has had little attention, save in certain notable cases, to spare for Obscurantism and her favourite daughter, Superstition. Superstition is not easy to deal with. Scientifically-minded men find it hard to realize how anyone can be superstitious, and feel that superstition is so foolish and feeble that there is no need to condemn it as it must quickly succumb to its own futility. Kind-hearted religious men shrink from giving pain to well-meaning fanatics whose religion appears to be so interwoven with superstition that the extirpation of the latter may mean the death of the former. These men have not studied the history of religion, especially of the Christian religion, or they would realize that, as bad money drives out good, so superstition drives out true religion unless active steps

are taken to check it. In the *Book of Homilies*, far the longest homily (some 65 folio pages) is entitled, 'Against Peril of Idolatry,' and that peril is not past to-day. In this generation we are witnessing the revival of superstition in many forms, and unless our episcopate takes serious steps to check it, we shall shortly witness a disastrous schism in the English Church, or else see that Church wither into an obscurantist sect.

We do not suppose that episcopal discipline can alone prevail. We need a ministry educated on modern, truth-loving lines, and this we are not securing in adequate numbers to deal with the situation. But until we can get such a ministry, we need episcopal action to control the illegal propagation of superstition. This propagation is now very highly organized; the ecclesiastical machinery has been captured by the obscurantists in a number of localities; and a Bishop who adopts a disciplinary attitude will find himself hampered and opposed at every turn.

Bishop Barnes at his enthronement said no more in condemnation of the cultus of the eucharistic elements and the doctrines and practices connected with it than was said by our Reformers, yet the indignant protest which his words have aroused might lead ignorant readers to suppose that he had denied a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith. We append two specimens of these diatribes. The first is taken from a leading article in the *Church Times*.

> 'We must speak plainly of Dr. Barnes. His elevation to the see of Birmingham filled us with anxiety. . . . Dr. Barnes is a narrow mathematician and scientist. He knows, to judge from his words and writings, little of history, less of metaphysics. And to him, we fear, a large part of human nature is a sealed book. To him Darwinism is the celestial science, and he clings to it with all the fanaticism with which a mediaeval logician clung to scholasticism, or a Cromwellian Puritan to predestination. The hardness and fanaticism we understand and regret. But in a Bishop of the Church of England even hardness and fanaticism are no excuse for intolerance and bad manners.
>
> 'We are sorry to say it, but we fear that the policy which the Bishop intends at present to follow is a policy that will be tolerant of everything except the Catholic Faith. . . .
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> 'It is now the duty of the laity, particularly in Birmingham but also in the Church of England generally, to let his lordship know that they will not tolerate, even from one in his high position, vulgar attacks on the central mystery of the Catholic Faith. We yield to none in our respect for the episcopal office, but the honour of the Blessed Sacrament comes first.'

Our second citation is from the pen of the Rev. Bruce Cornford in his magazine, the *Mayfly* (known locally as the *Gadfly*), 'being the Parish Magazine of the Church of St. Matthew, Portsmouth.'

> Science knows a little about 'materia medica.'
> Science knows a very little about 'materia psychica.'
> Science knows hardly anything at all about 'pneumatology.'
> The doctrine of the 'Real Presence' of the Son of God in the Blessed Sacrament is wholly pneumatolical.
> Physiology, mathematics, psychology, brought to bear upon this Divine Mystery, become merely ridiculous.
> Any man therefore, with any pretensions whatever to scientific knowledge who advances these twilight twitterings as a reason for doubting the manifestation of a spiritual Fact, merely dubs himself a fool.
> He is like an errand boy who says he does not believe in the differential calculus.
> Such a poor wretch is the new Bishop of Birmingham, Dr. Barnes.
> Every faithful Christian man and woman in the world should refuse to have anything whatever to do with him.
> His orders should be deliberately disobeyed, his authority flouted, and his person ignored.
> His appointment is an insult to the whole Church, from which he should be deliberately cast out.
> His hasty and ignorant words of heresy have caused infinite pain to thousands of loving and faithful servants of our Lord.
> They were provocative, shocking, and in the worst possible taste.
> How the clergy of the Church with the noble traditions of St. Alban's (at Birmingham) and many others in this unhappy diocese are going to act remains to be seen.
> The largest public hall in the city should not be large enough to voice their terrible indignation and protest.
> Either he should be forced to resign his episcopate, or (on being converted to the Catholic faith) should do public penance in sackcloth in his own cathedral.
> What would happen to a Roman Catholic bishop who mouthed this kind of cheap sensational rubbish?
> In twenty-four hours his place would know him no more!

A well-known publicist would dub these citations 'Catholic ubricities,' but possibly the right term for them is diabolisms.

Dr. Neville Talbot's Protest.

Of the younger Anglo-Catholic prelates none is more deservedly respected than Dr. Neville Talbot, Bishop of Pretoria. This fact rather than sympathy with his utterances has led the *Church Times* of November 21 to publish an important article by him protesting against 'a movement, the drift of which will end in the adoption by the English Church of the whole cultus of modern Counter-Reformation Catholicism.'

The Bishop regards the drift towards Rome as intelligible enough, but also as fatal, because, as he remarks, 'We need more than cultus, we need truth.' Of course we do, but how many Churchmen are aware of this?

The weakness of the drift towards Rome lies not in the desire of its promoters for re-union, nor in their reverence for Roman organization, doctrinal definiteness, and power of psychological appeal, but in its obscurantism. With a moral fervour worthy of a Christian teacher and of his Oxford training, Dr. Neville Talbot writes:

> 'None of the reasons which operate to induce to the adoption of Catholic customs and services can rightly outweigh jealousy for historical truth. To adopt, for pragmatic religious reasons, Roman Catholic cultus wholesale is to adopt that which is hopelessly compromised on this vital issue. It is to confound, indiscriminately, history and legend. The only—at any rate, the main—*raison d'être* of the Anglican Church and of Anglo-Catholicism is a loyalty to truth which will not, for the sake of religious comfort or requirements, "fudge" the question of real history, nor avoid the pain of the battle which that question involves . . . To do so is to betray our trust and sell the pass. To do so is to throw away that antisepsis, of which religion is ever in need, namely, moral and intellectual candour.'

The Bishop concludes his article with a strong appeal to Anglo-Catholics to come to a decision and to act accordingly.

> 'It is no doubt possible for many honest and truth-loving men, if born within the Roman Catholic Church, to make the accommodations necessary to enable them to remain devoted Roman Catholics. But I think that nothing but either a hunger for religious security at any price, or a despair of the capacity of the Gospel to survive criticism or inquiry, or both together, can lead men from without to surrender to Rome.
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> 'I plead with Anglo-Catholics to find out where they are and to act upon what they find. I can imagine and feel with the discomforts of some of them amid our present Anglican distresses and readjustments. The process of re-fashioning our *lex orandi* so as to make it harmonize with an historically candid *lex credendi*—to make our religious tradition ring in tune with truth—is indeed painful, perilous, and straining. If they cannot bear the strain, which is essentially the strain and price of loyalty to truth, or if, on the other hand, they must have the full Roman cultus, they should act accordingly and become Roman Catholics. To remain Anglicans, while abandoning loyalty to Anglican standards and at the same time adopting with self-willed fancy whatever they like in Catholic tradition, is good neither for them nor for the English Church. They may find a satisfying refuge in Rome, but they will leave to others the task of commending the Catholic faith to the conscience, moral and intellectual, of our time.'

This appeal will weigh with thoughtful members of the Catholic party, but it will be uttered in vain for large numbers. How small is the *per centage* in any community who are concerned

with historical truth or are capable of arriving at any decision about it! The mystic on the one hand, and the pragmatist on the other, are not disposed to find any real connection between religion and historical truth. Although education was never more commended than it is to-day, yet we appear to be in the back-wash of an anti-intellectualist movement. In such a crisis large numbers are not concerned with asking: What is truth? Their question is: What is trumps? Rome claims with superb confidence to have the goods and to be delivering them all the time. Those then who feel they have souls to be saved and that Materialism and Secularism cannot save them, and are at the same time indifferent to the claims of truth, will naturally be drawn Romewards, and that despite the appeal of the Bishop of Pretoria. No doubt a reaction will come later on, and many will realize that 'Truth is trumps,' but we see little indication that the reaction is near at hand.

Anglo-Catholicism and Sound Learning.

We are glad to note in the November number of the organ of the English Church Union that this influential Church Society recently resolved at a meeting held in Oxford to promote sound learning as an important part of its programme. The forward-policy is thus summarized by Dr. Charles Harris:

> 'It is proposed, firstly, that the Union should endeavour to become a learned society fundamentally interested in the study of the faith in its general relation to modern thought and modern life. Secondly, that it should cultivate the closest possible relations with the ancient Universities, and also with the newly-formed provincial Universities and colleges. Thirdly, that in order to secure more adequate representation in the Union for academic learning, special and direct representation on the Council should be offered to University branches of the E.C.U. Fourthly, that active educational work by means of lectures, study-circles, classes, and organized courses of reading, should be undertaken as far as possible by all local branches of the Union. And last, and most important, that the Union should explicitly recognize that it exists to defend the Catholic faith by means of sound learning by adding to its present objects the following new one. This sums up briefly but exhaustively the whole policy of the Committee: "To promote study and research and the dissemination of literature in all branches of theology and ethics, and in those departments of philosophy, psychology, and natural science which are closely related to religion." The ultimate aim of the Committee, of course, is to advance the limits of human knowledge in the sphere of religion, and to attain by corporate effort the kind of synthesis of ancient truth with modern knowledge which was attained by a single mind, that of the Angelical Doctor, in the thirteenth century, but

which is now only attainable by many minds working in concert and keeping ever in view the ideal of the unity of all knowledge.'

This programme is really splendid, and if the E.C.U. can carry it through in the spirit in which it is conceived, all schools in the English Church will benefit by their labours, and not least the Anglo-Catholic school itself. To-day, thanks to the efforts of a long line of fearless Christian teachers, and not least of Bishop Gore, one of the leaders in this present movement, the Church of England grants a large measure of freedom to all serious scholars to express themselves. Such an undertaking as that which the E.C.U. proposes will do not a little to promote Christian union, Christian progress, and Christian expansion. It is a most significant and hopeful event.

One Candle, but not two Rings.

The progress of Prayer-Book revision is far from cheering. The accounts of it which appear in the daily press under such headings as 'One Candle at Baptisms,' 'Two Rings at Weddings,' indicate that the popular attitude is becoming unsympathetic, if not actually contemptuous. Meanwhile a number of seriously-minded Church people are becoming alarmed and hostile. The memorial protesting against changes in the Service of Holy Communion, and against alternative Communion Services, prepared by Bishop Knox for presentation to the House of Bishops, and signed by 304,500 adult communicants, is highly significant. While we have advocated for years past the authorisation of one or more revised Communion Offices to be allowed as alternatives to our present service, we have to confess that there is an increasing number of Liberals or Modernists who are joining the ranks of those opposed to this policy. The growing conviction that Anglo-Catholics cannot be reconciled to loyalty to the Prayer Book by any concessions short of the whole Roman cultus has greatly strengthened this spirit of reaction. Dr. Darwell Stone's very honest declaration that Anglo-Catholics demand reservation of the Communion, not simply in order to communicate the sick but for purposes of adoration, has increased enormously the opposition to reservation. The wide dissemination of Bishop Knox's Letter[1] to the Primate on the occasion of the presentation of his memorial will do not a

[1] Published by Longmans, Green and Co., price 3*d*.

little to strengthen the case against revision and alternative uses. The Archbishop of Canterbury was credited some years ago with assuring those who complained of the slowness of revision, that the longer it took, the better it would be. This seems far from being the case. A revision accomplished, as it well might have been, twelve years ago—The Letters of Business were issued in 1906—would have been much superior to what we appear to be promised at this stage. It is becoming clear that we must, most unwillingly, be satisfied, at any rate for some years to come, with one Office for Holy Communion as we have it unrevised. Liberals, under the present circumstances, are unable conscientiously to support the proposal for an alternative Communion Service which Bishop Knox describes in the following terms :

> 'The new service, with its altered Prayers of Consecration, its ornaments of the Church and ministers, vestments, lights, incense, and acts of elevation and adoration, its encouragement of non-communicating attendance, its reservation of the Sacrament which, we know, will be used for adoration and benediction, is substantially and for all practical purposes the Sacrifice of the Mass. It legalizes that service in every one of our churches. For that Sacrifice we cannot make room in our Church, not merely on account of certain discarded century-old controversies, but because it is another religion. It rests on a different idea of the relation between God and man; it re-erects the barrier of a priesthood interposed between God and man, which barrier it was the work of the Incarnation and Atonement to throw down; it puts the Church in the place of Christ' (p. 10).

And this would be by no means the last step. Mariolatry would follow and much else. It is high time that that large body of unorganized Churchmen so thinly represented in the Church Assembly should take vigorous steps to express their deep dissatisfaction with the form which Prayer Book revision is taking. 'Better to bear the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.'

The New Policy in Religious Education.

At last there seems to be a real prospect that the religious difficulty in English schools may be settled on a sound basis. Hard facts are weakening the antagonisms of religious educationists. English Churchmen are feeling seriously the great financial strain of maintaining their school buildings. Free Churchmen are realizing that the dangers arising from a secularist system of popular education are far greater than any to be apprehended from a religious educational policy which

may seem to be more advantageous to Anglicans than to Free Churchmen. The recent debate in the Church Assembly indicated that the majority of Churchmen are prepared to accept in place of the existing dual control of schools, the principle of unity of administration with variety of type. Such a policy is not only educationally sound, but is also in harmony with our national history and character. Nevertheless, like most good things, it will be immensely difficult to achieve unless there be a very large measure of initiative and freedom granted to local educational authorities, and the cultivation of a spirit of pure goodwill which puts the welfare of the child altogether first and has no regard whatsoever for denominational interests.

The Bishop of Liverpool, whose recent declaration that he desired the new Liverpool cathedral to be regarded as the spiritual home of all Christian denominations in Liverpool has given an inspiration and uplift to religious life there, is a strong supporter of the new educational policy. Dr. David's idea of the method of carrying out the new policy has a note of primitive Christian freshness about it based on the conviction that the human soul is naturally Christian. Dr. David is against legislation 'requiring' local authorities to take over the non-provided schools in their districts, and then allocating all the schools to the different denominations. Compulsion, he rightly urges, would rouse resistance. The Bishop's policy, set forth in the following summary, will no doubt seem fantastically idealist to the bureaucrat and professional politician, but it has attractions for the responsible English citizen who desires peace and progress combined with religion and morality in a sphere where these things are absolutely essential.

> 'I should much prefer to approach the local authorities as reasonable people and to make the reasonable suggestion that, as and where possible, schools of a particular character should be continued, and even provided, to meet the particular needs and desires of the population they are intended to serve. Personally I would go further in trusting local authorities. Instead of a central solution being an Act for the whole of England, I would aim at a minimum of administrative compulsion, and give the widest possible scope for terms of transfer and other arrangements adjusted to the different conditions of different localities by men who know the localities and the conditions and are much more likely to satisfy them justly than Westminster, or even Whitehall . . . We ought not willingly to transfer a single school except as part of a policy which we can reasonably regard as lasting and secure. First, adequate religious instruction should be provided in every school, both elementary and secondary,

for all who desire it—or, shall we say, for all except those who do not desire it?—and adequate provision in training colleges and departments for all students who wish to be trained to give such instruction. I believe we may fairly say that is the tacit desire of the vast majority of the citizens of this country. Secondly, there should be statutory advisory committees, both local and national, to work out together the best ways of presenting the truth about God in Christ to children. The best of our teachers have found already what meets the real needs of the children.'

The breaking down of barriers in the educated religious world as the result of modern methods of Biblical study, combined with the fact that these modern methods enormously increase for the child the interest which can be aroused in Bible lessons by competent teachers, has done something to win the teaching profession to greater interest in Scriptural teaching, and promises to render whole-hearted co-operation in religious education possible for all, who are not obscurantists and secularists, to a degree which was not possible a generation ago.

Methodist Re-union.

The Wesleyan Methodist, Primitive Methodist, and United Methodist Churches are taking a vote this month on the question of re-union. In 1917 representatives of the three Churches met together to discuss union. In 1918 they began to draw up a Scheme of Union. Year by year the scheme has been amended and various votes have been taken on it. The coming vote is to be the decisive vote. It is to be on the question: 'Are you in favour of Methodist Union on the scheme which has been drawn up?' And the answer must be 'Yes' or 'No.'

Two years ago a vote was taken in the Wesleyan quarterly meetings and showed a majority of four to one in favour of union, and a similar vote is expected in the December meetings. The two other Churches have not yet voted on the principle of union in their local courts, but their vote two years ago on the scheme of union, and the decisive votes of their Conferences, indicate that they are in favour of union and will decide to carry it through. The three Churches spring from the same root, hold the same doctrines, and have similar forms of government. There is no serious obstacle to union, and the Conference of each Church has declared that the scheme of union can be accepted 'without the sacrifice of any principle vital to Methodism.' The expected union will make the Methodist Church by

far the largest Nonconformist Church in this country and second only to the Church of England. It will have 4,368 ministers, 37,697 lay preachers; 898,936 members and probationers in addition to adherents; 1,541,517 Sunday School scholars with 173,261 officers and teachers. It will possess 13,558 Sunday Schools and 12,242 churches. The property it will own was estimated at £35,000,000 on the pre-war basis. The value now is probaby £50,000,000. It will also have valuable properties and a large membership in the foreign mission field. The movement towards union was initiated by the Mother Church—the Wesleyan, and its consummation will have a profound effect on the religious life of the nation. It is being watched with great interest and hope by all denominations, and by the Methodists overseas, who number about 30,000,000.

We wish this effort every possible success. What we ought as Englishmen to be primarily concerned with is a re-united English Christendom accompanied, if possible, by a steady increase in fraternal relations with all other national Churches.

A Jewish Christian Conference.

An important and interesting conference took place on Nov. 27, at the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, N.W.1, in which Liberal, Reform, and Orthodox Jews, Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Quakers, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, Wesleyans, and Anglicans (nearly 600 in all) took part. The Conference subject was 'Religion as an Educational Force.' Rabbi Israel Mattuck presided, and among those who joined in the discussion were Mr. Claude Montefiore, Dr. Herbert Gray, Dr. Mellone, Mr. Wicksteed, Principal Workman, and the Rev. P. T. R. Kirk of the Industrial Christian Fellowship. There were two sessions. The theme of the first session was, 'The Education of the young in a sense of social responsibility'; the theme of the second session, 'The Dynamic Force of Belief in God.'

Many sound and sensible things were said, but perhaps not many original ones. Mrs. Rosa Hobhouse spoke of the evil educational influence of wealth. Mr. Wicksteed ennunciated as the golden rule of education, 'Do unto children as ye would that grown-ups had done unto you.' The Hon. Lily Montague pointed out that while the church or synagogue provided dog-

matic teaching, the home teaching was mainly indirect. She urged that children should be encouraged to discuss religious problems, but reverently. Mr. Hibbert was of opinion that children should only be punished with their own concurrence. He also maintained that modern education did not concentrate sufficient attention on social service. Mr. Ackroyd pointed out that many economic problems are really moral ones. Dr. Herbert Gray insisted that belief in God does not bring us to the heart of the subject, because believing in God is one thing, but knowing Him is another, and it is the latter which is conspicuously the source of energy: 'They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength.' Therein lay the real cure for the paralysis of the will. Through contact with God the human personality got unified.

Mr. Claude Montefiore, who closed the Conference, said: 'They had come there not to slur over their differences, nor on the other hand for a spiritual tug-of-war. They had met on a common platform to discuss social questions which concerned them all, and to discuss them from a religious point of view, which in its common basis and common hope united both Christian and Jew. He was proud that England had produced this Conference.

SANTAYANA ON MODERNISM

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., F.B.A., Dean of St. Paul's.

ATTACKS on Liberal Churchmanship from the side of traditionalism are usually feeble, disingenuous, and disfigured by personalities. We pay too much attention to them, and not enough to criticisms of our position by rationalists and agnostics, who have rejected Christianity altogether. It is more important that we should vindicate our claim to be Christians than that we should justify ourselves for breaking with a part of ecclesiastical tradition.

Of these assaults from an alien camp the most brilliant and damaging, in my opinion, is the essay of Professor George Santayana, which was published in 1913 in the book called *Winds of Doctrine*. It does not seem to have been so much noticed as it deserves; we cannot wonder that orthodox apolo-

gists have not cared to call attention to it. I propose first to give a summary of the argument, and then to try to answer it. In order to avoid mistakes by careless readers, I shall use inverted commas in my analysis of the case against Modernism; they must not be taken as indicating verbal quotation.

'The Christian religion is essentially a product of the East. It is only in Asia that men are able to treat all existence with disdain and hold it superbly at arm's length, while at the same time hoping for miracle to redress the wrongs of the poor and put down the mighty from their seat. Its attitude to life is unworldly, prayerful, all-forgiving, idle, and revolutionary. Christianity renounces the world, but expects its discomfiture. Reality, for the Jew—herein he differs from the Indian—is a series of *events*. His promised land is a bit of earth; his kingdom an historical fact. The Jew is too materialistic to be either an idolater or a philosopher. His faith is concrete and rooted in history, past and future. This combination of unworldliness and positivism produced the later prophetism, with its strange mixture of moral appeal and militant patriotism. The hand of the Lord would descend on the wicked world heavily and very soon. Heathen civilization was to be overthrown in the twinkling of an eye. Those who hoped to be saved must watch and pray for the coming of the kingdom; it was superfluous for them to study the dead past or take thought for the morrow. The cataclysm was at hand; a new heaven and earth would be enrolled before that very generation.

'This prophecy came to nothing. But after all, this world must soon vanish for each one of us; the prophecy of destruction is being fulfilled continually; the need of repentance is as urgent for all men as if the world were coming to an end. It was only necessary for the Church to change "this wicked world" into "this transitory life," and "the coming of the kingdom" into "life everlasting."

'Even when primitive Hebraism was deeply coloured by a Platonic sort of religion, the "Idea of the Good" was hypostatized as a living and active God, and the spiritual world was given a habitation by a sort of supramundane physics. But the Modernists are not disciples of Plato; and in rejecting both Hebraism and Hellenism, they have committed a fundamental apostasy from Christianity.

'Such a religion as Christianity could never convert the world without denying its own principles. The ages of faith were so only superficially. Christendom in the time of Dante, or of Philip II, was anything rather than a Kingdom of God upon earth. The Church, the army, the Inquisition, were alien to the Christian life; they were embodiments of greed, or chivalry, or of the lust for temporal power.

'The Renaissance and the Revolution, which are living programmes, not past events, are a revolt of the world against Christianity. The Renaissance aims at restoring Paganism, pure and simple. If it had not been for the Reformation, it might have provided an euthanasia for the Church. Christian dogma might have come to be understood to be nothing but myth, its miracles nothing but legend, its sacraments mere symbols, its Bible pure literature, and its whole function simply to lend a warm, mystical aureole to human culture and ignorance. But Luther put a stop to this humanizing movement, and, as Clough says, brought back theology once more in a flood over Europe.

'Modernism is the infiltration into minds that wish to remain Catholic of the rationalistic study of the Bible, and of modern mystical and idealistic philosophy. But in accepting scientific methods of proof they have accepted a standard of probability which is not that of Christianity. The rejection of miracles *a priori* expresses a conviction that natural law operates universally; it implies a rationalistic philosophy, which is incompatible with the methods of revelation and redemption used, in the belief of Christians, by God.

'The Catholic Modernist, whose devotional life has survived his rejection of Church authority, has to adopt a personal, psychological, variable standard of inspiration. He will not become a Protestant, because, as he says, the age of partial heresy is past. He is really a free-thinker, but will not own it to himself. Why, he asks, should he not remain in the Church? He is devout, with a sort of archæological piety; he is learned and eloquent and wistful. Why should not he, instead of seceding, educate other Catholics up to his own level?

'The Modernist keeps the whole Catholic system, but believes in no part of it as it demands to be believed. He has ceased to be a Christian to become a connoisseur of Christian-

ity. He believes in history, philosophy, and evolution; perhaps he believes in Kant or Hegel; but he does not believe in sin, or salvation, or revelation. Modernism is the love of Christianity in those who perceive that it is a fable. It is the religion of a man who wishes to be a Pagan without ceasing to be a Catholic. Modernism takes the seriousness out of religion. It takes away the pang of sin; it steals reality from the Four Last Things, and from the Christ of devotion.

'The studies of the Modernist, which are those of any lay scholar, soon put him out of sympathy with clericalism at every point. He tries to reform the Church by reconciling it with secular culture. He forgets that the Gospel was a revolt against the world and a renunciation of all its standards. He forgets that Christianity won its way because it furnished a needful sanctuary from the sorrows and injustices of life, a holy precinct where one might live, with a sacred learning, a sacred philosophy, and a sacred art; where, if one wished, it was possible to spend a retired life in charity and devotion. These gifts were not offered to the world at large; but they are still offered, and really given, by the Catholic Church to those who wish to take them. The Church has added much to the New Testament, but it has lost nothing; the original Gospel is still there. It still preaches contempt of the world, poverty and chastity; it still rejects as an aberration all that is characteristic of modern civilization. It has outlasted many secular creeds; may it not outlast Kant, Darwin, and Bergson?

'The Modernists think that the weakness of the Church lies in not following the inspirations of the age. But an idea which is fashionable is on its way to become old-fashioned. The Gospel was foolishness to the Greeks of St. Paul's day; three centuries later they were ready to swallow it, miracles and all. Clear ideas on history or science make a much more limited appeal than a religion of miracle and sacrament and supernatural favours. Therefore in a frank supernaturalism, in a tight clericalism, lies the sole hope of the Church. Stiff believers are the only believers that the secular power needs to reckon with. The Church will not convert the world; but some will listen to it in the future, as many have listened to it in the past. But Modernism is suicide. Its concessions are mortal; for it concedes that everything in Christianity is an illusion.'

This drastic criticism deals only with Roman Catholic Modernism. Professor Santayana has expressed elsewhere a great liking and respect for the English character; but he does not take the Englishman seriously as a religious man. Protestantism, in his view, is a half-way house between Catholicism and rationalism, and it stands on a slippery slope. Ultimately the Protestant will be compelled to climb back to the top or to slide down to the bottom, unless he evolves a new religion more suited to his idiosyncrasies. But this is not all. The Professor does not seem to take religion of any kind very seriously. 'What is religion,' he asks, 'but human experience interpreted by human imagination?' Religion is for him a poetical or dramatic representation of our ideals, a graceful embellishment of our hard and prosaic existence. What truth religion may claim is aesthetic or imaginative, not scientific or metaphysical. And yet he sees that the kind of religion which is a living force is something very different—a naïve conviction of the objective reality of beliefs which to him are mere illusions. He therefore views religion entirely from the outside. His explanation of the function of religion in what he calls the life of reason is plausible to those who do not seriously need (or who think that they do not seriously need) religious faith. To such enlightened spirits religion remains only as a source of aesthetic pleasure.

It requires, however, an almost cynical want of confidence in human intelligence to hold that beliefs which have played a larger part in history than any others are illusions of the imagination—a projection of the ought-to-be upon the field of given reality. He perhaps hardly realizes how impossible it is for the religious mind to accept this explanation. For religion, the ideal already exists, actual and realized, in the mind of God. Our imaginative concepts are symbols, not of our hopes and wishes, but of what we believe to be the nature of a living God.

He accepts the apocalyptic theory of Christ's preaching, without considering the psychological conditions necessary to generate such a belief. The preaching of John the Baptist was harsh, violent, and terrifying; what was the state of mind which made it credible? And why was the appeal of Christ a call to repentance, amendment, and love to man? Was all this mere *Interimsethik*, or was it not rather the core of the preaching?

Again, if the Gospel rested on a typically Oriental view of

life, how did it find its most congenial soil in Graeco-Roman Europe? We can trace the gradual abandonment of Messianism in the New Testament, especially in St. Paul's Epistles, and the growth of the Greek or Graeco-Jewish idea of the Logos, with a widely different view of human immortality. This was a far greater change than Santayana allows, and would have been impossible if Jewish apocalyptism had been the essence of the Gospel.

Early Catholicism was, as he says, on one side 'a kind of Platonic religion.' Its affinities were less with Plato himself than with the later Platonism, for which the Ideas were no longer universals contemplated by the Creator and used by him as models, but the contents of the Divine mind, inseparable from the Divine life. Christianity personalized the conception of *Nous* (Spirit or Intelligence), and regarded the creation as the product of conscious will. The 'intelligible world'—heaven—was still the pattern from which the universe was copied, but the personality of the Creator stood above and apart from even the perfect realization of His thoughts. Professor Santayana speaks of the Platonic heaven as 'supernatural physics,' and evidently thinks that such a philosophy is obsolete. But though we must admit the danger of making all experience, like the swan on St. Mary's Lake, 'float double, swan and shadow,' the desire to judge all the things of time by setting them against an unchangeable, eternal, and perfect background is one of which we need not be ashamed. The Christian ideal world is the Christian's real world; he believes that it exists here and now, yesterday, to-day and for ever. I am not concerned to defend those Modernists who have discarded Hellenism as well as Hebraism. They have a philosophy of their own, which does not appeal to me. The Professor may be right when he says that this school has really cut itself loose from the Christian view of life.

In the Renaissance Santayana sees only a Pagan revival. But it only became Pagan when it became corrupt and decadent. It is strange that anyone should consider art and beauty un-Christian; Christ Himself was a lover of flowers and mountains, and not in the least like the hermits and anchorites of the desert. As soon as the danger was perceived that the new

learning might 'provide an euthanasia for Christianity,' there was a vigorous moral revolt, which bore fruit in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and among the northern humanists who, as Mr. Richardson has said, were 'the religious first-fruits and finest flower' of the Renaissance, before the Protestant secession took place.

By taking the monk or begging friar as the typical Christian, Santayana finds it easy to represent Christianity as the foe of civilization. But Christ was not an ascetic; He and His apostles all worked at useful trades; and the call to the so-called religious life, apart from the world, was never addressed to all Christians. Even before the persecutions were over, Christianity began to attract some of the best scholarship of the age; the long Christological controversies were the latest stage of Greek philosophy, and exercised the acutest intellects of three centuries. If the science of the early Christians was bad, it was because there was no better available at the time.

Liberal Churchmen cannot for a moment admit that Christianity is irrational and anti-scientific. The Church used and appropriated the best thought of the time till the Dark Ages set in and there was no more thought; and as soon as the first streaks of dawn appeared, we find it eagerly consulting Aristotle and the Arabs, in order to be abreast of 'the best that is said and thought in the world.' The Wars of Religion undoubtedly left Catholicism narrowed, hardened, and stiffened; they left Protestantism fissiparous and uncertain of its foundations. These misfortunes made the Churches unadaptive and obscurantist at the beginning of the modern period, when science was making new adaptations imperative; nor have we ever made good the ground then lost. What Greek philosophy was for the early Church; what the new scholarship was for the medieval Church, that natural science is for the modern Church. It is the old task of reconstruction under new forms; the question is whether we shall faithlessly shirk a demand which was successfully met in the critical periods of the past.

Lecky has summed up very well the changes which the growing rational, moral, and spiritual consciousness of modern times have made in the framework of religious belief. (1) The decline of belief in miracle involved by the new conception of natural

law. (2) The growth of new ideas of God, which involved the decay of religious persecution, of belief in witchcraft, and of horrible notions concerning future punishment. (3) The abolition of belief in the guilt of intellectual error, and of barbarous asceticism. (4) The secularization of political life, and new habits of thought which affected all judgments. (5) Industrial changes which created the science of political economy. But of all changes, the Copernican astronomy was perhaps the most momentous. As Santayana says, it remains embedded in the Christian tradition as an alien and hostile element, like a spent bullet lodged in the flesh.

But these problems are not greater than others which the Church formerly had faith and courage enough to face. They are not so serious as the great decision which it had to make in the first century, symbolised by the momentous vision which called to St. Paul to 'come into Macedonia and help us'—the decision to enter the sphere of Graeco-Roman culture. For the question of miracle is really a scientific, not a religious question. It is the question of whether God rules the world by one uniform system of laws, or whether there is a disturbing element—a 'higher order,' if we will—which from time to time intervenes to suspend the ordinary sequence of cause and effect. If science —including biology and psychology—decides that the evidence for occasional intervention is insufficient, religion will be none the poorer. There will be necessary changes in the articles of belief officially recognized as essential; but the Christian faith does not stand or fall with the theory of dualistic supernaturalism.

Santayana, rather contemptuously perhaps, recommends the Church to make no concessions, but to maintain a stiff, unbending orthodoxy, because this is the way to attract those who want what are called the consolations of religion. Some modern discoveries, he reminds us, will probably be discredited; others will continue to be ignored by those who seek for the refuge which the Church offers from the storms of life. We must leave it to a pragmatist to defend a policy which sounds to us like treason against the Holy Spirit of truth. Such accommodations have not always been characteristic of the Church. Early Christianity would make no terms with idolatry or polytheism; it preferred to be the creed of a small and persecuted minority;

and at the Reformation the rival convictions, if narrow, were deep and sincere. The refusal to change is really a counsel of cowardice; it betrays either an indifference to truth, or scepticism as to our chance of finding it. The dangers to faith of perfect candour and intellectual honesty are far less than is often supposed; and we cannot really get rid of doubt by refusing to give it a hearing. Beneath the smooth exterior of traditionalism lurk many importunate questionings, which repression does not make more healthy.

The charge that Modernism makes no saints and converts no sinners cannot be lightly put aside. It is true that the Liberal theologian is often a student by profession or by natural inclination. Sometimes he may be interested in religious problems rather than himself a deeply religious man. To live among books, delightful as it is, tends to estrange a man from the warm concrete interests of humanity. It saves him from some temptations, but makes a barrier between him and the majority of his fellows. In extreme cases, the most real things in the world for the student are learned theories and the professors who support them. He may easily forget that for most people these theories only touch life as they affect the very human needs of struggling and sorely perplexed men and women. Intellectual honesty seems an easy virtue to him; to the average man, who is a sort of pragmatist by instinct, the matter appears differently. But if he finds himself out of sympathy with popular religion, the fault is not all on his side. Crass superstition, bigotry and fanaticism, and contented ignorance are ugly things, and it is his calling and duty to fight against them. He will not have the infidels on his side. They regard the clergyman as a cheapjack who is paid to cry up certain wares; if he does not speak to his brief, he is not earning his fees, and ought to be cashiered. The two extreme parties, who agree that scholarship has nothing to teach them about religion, combine against the Liberal.

The learned professor may sometimes be a man who exerts a powerful spiritual influence, but as a rule he is not called to preach the Gospel in the streets and lanes of the city. He is, we must frankly admit, sometimes ineffective as a parish priest. But the common belief that he is unlikely to be a man of holy life is, I think, unwarranted. We ought to take each type at its

best, and to consider whether those who frame their lives by personal conviction, gained by patient study, may not be as good Christians as those who rest on the authority of Church or Book.

There is an old and glorious tradition of Christian humanism, more or less independent of Catholicism and Protestantism. It is not, as Santayana seems to think, a revival of Paganism, but a legitimate development of Christianity, implicit in its principles and never unrepresented in its history. At its best, it fosters that best kind of unworldliness which is based on knowledge of the world, that breadth of view which welcomes truth from whatever source it comes, instead of rejecting every coin that does not bear the stamp of some ecclesiastical mint; it believes that the age of revelation is not past, but that God is even now manifesting Himself in every addition to human knowledge; it longs to see the Spirit of Christ operating within civilization, and not only among those who have fled from it. It is almost incomprehensible to us that anyone should suppose that Christianity stands or falls with the truth of miracles and prophecy. To us it stands or falls with the truth of a definite and quite recognizable standard of values, involving a way of living and a characteristic outlook upon the world. We are as strongly convinced as any Traditionalist that this revelation, which Christ brought, is true and divine, and we can say as confidently as any of the early disciples, 'Lord, to whom should we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.'

We need not be distressed to find that preachers who lead their hearers back to the weak and beggarly elements of superstition make a wider appeal than we can hope to do. There are current superstitions, very much alive, compared with which the crudest Christian traditionalism is enlightened and philosophical. The intrinsic intelligence of the European does not seem to be progressing—there is no reason why it should be—and many of our fellow-citizens are mentally still in the stone age. But the advance of knowledge has made a revision of many old formulas necessary, and it is sheer want of faith to fear that these necessary changes may destroy the Christian religion. The only danger is that the Traditionalists may turn the faith of the Church into that kind of religion which can be destroyed by new knowledge. In that case, the Holy Spirit will have to work through new channels.

MR. CLAUDE MONTEFIORE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THE NEW

By the Rev. HUBERT HANDLEY, M.A., formerly Vicar of St. Thomas's, Camden Town, N.W.

MR. Montefiore's book, *The Old Testament and After*, readily reminds one of Sir James Frazer's kindred work, which might have been called *The Old Testament and Before*. It was not called that. It was called by a more definite and now famous title: *Folk-lore in the Old Testament*. Sir James Frazer digs away there at the roots of that stately tree in the forest of literature—the Hebrew Bible; he digs at the roots, discovers them to the view of the outside observer, exposes their fibre and shapes, their habits and function, their absorbent relation to the earth, their nutritive relation to the trunk, their hidden and fundamental indispensableness. 'I have attempted,' he writes, 'on the lines of folk-lore, to trace some of the beliefs and institutions of Israel backward to earlier and cruder stages of thought and practice which have their analogies in the faiths and customs of existing savages.' That is his first lesson, an instruction in Scriptural origins. His second lesson is an instruction in comparative religion. The tree of the Old Testament, he teaches, is not an anomaly, not a sport; its roots are like other roots, they belong to the whole radical world; and the tree itself, though in one sense of supreme distinction, is yet a tree, a whole tree, and nothing but a tree. 'It should henceforth be possible,' he says, 'to view the history of Israel in a truer, if less romantic, light as that of a people not miraculously differentiated from all other races by divine revelation, but evolved like them by a slow process of natural selection from an embryonic condition of ignorance and savagery.' The spiritual values of Israel survive. The great anthropologist expressly declares that his work is 'not to ignore, far less to disparage, that higher side of the Hebrew genius which has manifested itself in a spiritual religion and a pure morality, and of which the Old Testament is the imperishable monument.' Mr. Montefiore's book is the complement of Sir James Frazer's; expounding this very 'higher side of the Old Testament genius'; dealing with the tall, spreading branches of the Old

Testament tree; handling not source, but terminations. Montefiore makes no direct mention of Frazer, but the religious doctrine of *The Old Testament and After* is in happy, vital accord with the scientific doctrine of *Folk-lore in the Old Testament*.

Another book springs to the memory of the present writer, though many years have passed since he read it. There is, he fears, almost an impertinence in his recalling it to Mr. Montefiore's notice, for it was written by an illustrious, though defaulting and excommunicated, Jew, and is of its kind a Jewish classic. It is Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. It is strictly relevant to our subject. For Mr. Montefiore is an out-and-out Liberal; and his book is tempered and fortified throughout by cognizance of the tested results not only of modern science, but also of modern Biblical criticism. But of modern Biblical criticism Spinoza has been held to be the founder. 'Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*,' says J. A. Froude, 'was the forerunner of German historical criticism; the whole of which has been but the application of principles laid down in that remarkable book.' And, indeed, the most ordinary student perceives in Spinoza's volume an almost startling critical foresight. It is studded, whether the student can always accept them or not, with acute and prescient critical judgments. Thus: 'The truth of narratives, be they what they may, has nothing to do with the Divine Law'—that is Loisy, A.D. 1670, and his contrast between *matière d'histoire* and *matière de foi*. Again: 'It is shown that Scripture teaches only very Simple Doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct'—that is, A.D. 1670, *Literature and Dogma*. Again: What is credible is 'the broad outline of the Gospel narrative . . . Whatsoever is spurious or faulty can only have reference to details'—that is A.D. 1670, almost *verbatim* a clause in A Declaration on Biblical Criticism, signed by 1,725 Anglican clergymen, A.D. 1905. Once more: 'I have always been astonished,' writes Spinoza, 'that they [the two Books of Chronicles] have been included in the Bible by men who shut out from the canon the books of Wisdom, Tobit, and the others styled apocryphal'—that is, A.D. 1670, the recent Anglican Revised Lectionary.

We have thus tried to clear the approach to Mr. Montefiore's book before we get at its content; to show the scientific and critical liberty of his mind and treatment. Here it is in a

nutshell. As to science, he writes: 'Liberal Judaism . . . has attempted to fashion a Judaism which can look Science in the face without flinching.' As to criticism: 'When we are not hampered by having to accept everything in the Old Testament as good, or equally good . . . when we recognize degrees, we become so delightfully free.' Now to the book itself.

The Old Testament and After plainly splits into two divisions: (I) The Old Testament, (II) After. We will take them in order.

(I) The treatment of the Old Testament, again, may be divided into two parts: (1) one specifically Jewish, and (2) the other human.

(1) The Jew has a nerve, a sensory nerve, a peculiar and inherited nerve for the *esprit* in certain respects of ancient Jewish writings. He must have it. He enjoys here a racial sensibility. He is quick to perceive in his ancestral literature a colour, a touch, a taste which are particular to him and his people, and which are hidden from us others. This racial quality of the Old Testament may seem to most of us, including Liberal Jews, to be not its highest virtue; its moral and spiritual genius excels its national instincts; and the largest historic developments of the Hebrew Bible have left its Hebraic differentiae behind. Yet to learn, so far as we can, the original Hebrew mood and inwardness must for all of us widen our Scriptural outlook and enrich our Scriptural interpretation.

Let us, therefore, now adduce a specifically Jewish reading of a noble passage from the Old Testament. What was the primary meaning of Isaiah liii? its local, incipient meaning? what Riehm calls its 'Times-borrowed' meaning? We leave alone for the present its vast, latent spiritual meaning. We ask: What was its primary meaning? Mr. Montefiore gives, as he has an entire right to do, as he has, we may say, a duty to do, a Jewish answer. He Judaizes the passage. He finds in it a great and pathetic Jewish implication. He sees in it Israel stricken and persecuted from generation to generation for the welfare of mankind.

> 'No grander, holier, or more satisfying explanation of Israel's sufferings can be suggested than that put forward in the famous fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. If, indeed, the nations are the speaker (and it is delightful to think that, whether rightly or wrongly, this has been the predominating view of Jewish interpreters throughout the ages),

then what can be more comforting and more spiritual, more ethical and more religious, than the immortal words: "Surely he has borne our sicknesses and carried our pains: whereas we regarded him as stricken, smitten of God and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions: he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement which led unto our peace was upon him; and by his stripes we have been healed."'

Of course, Christians have Christianized the passage, and still Christianize it. Even to-day Christians generally *apply* its noble imagery to Christ, and find in the prophet's words dim, groping intimations of Calvary. Further, even Modernists, whose views of prophecy are the most radical, draw out from the passage its inner spiritual sense, and appropriate this to our Lord; and a hush comes over the Modernist congregation as verse after verse in mounting sublimity is read from that Lesson on Good Friday. But down the centuries till recent times Christians believed that the *primary* meaning of Isaiah liii, the actual image in the prophet's mind and his literal words, denoted the historic figure of Jesus. In Book XVIII, Chapter 29, of *The City of God*, St. Augustine writes of this very passage:

'Isaiah forgets not to proclaim Christ and His Church more amply than any other, in so much that some call him an evangelist rather than a prophet. One of his prophecies hear in brief, because I cannot stand upon many. [He cites the whole of Isaiah liii, with the three connected verses of lii.] . . . . Here is enough, needing but a little explanation, for the places are so plain that our enemies themselves are forced (despite their hearts) to acknowledge the truth.'

Once more, Mohammedans Mohammedanize the Hebrew prophets, and find in the religion of the Old Testament inchoate Islam—a preparation for Mohammedan persons, doctrines, or events. In Chapter II of the Koran Mohammed declares:

'They say, Become Jews or Christians that ye may be directed. Say, Nay we follow the religion of Abraham the orthodox, who was no idolater. Say, We believe in God, and that which hath been sent down unto us, and that which hath been sent down unto Abraham, and Ismael,* and Isaac, and Jacob, and the tribes, and that which was delivered unto Moses, and Jesus, and that which was delivered unto the prophets from their Lord: We make no distinction between any of them, and to God are we resigned. . . Turn therefore thy face towards the holy temple of Mecca; and wherever ye be, turn your faces towards that place.'

(2) We pass now to what we have termed Mr. Montefiore's *human* treatment of the Old Testament. By that we mean the manner in which, with marked insight and skill, he discloses again and again in the Old Testament its underlying spiritual

* So spelt in the Koran.

truths, its central spiritual foundations, on which have been reared the wonderful structures of the historic religions, Christian, Mohammedan, and later Jewish; on which he undauntedly hopes that the future world-religion may still be built; and in which we all may well discern bases of human faith which are potentially universal. We say 'potentially universal' without, for the moment, suggesting whether this universality is likely to rise through a Christian, Mohammedan, later Jewish, or other growth: that is a problem we shall glance at in our next section. Here we just note and rejoice in one or two specimens of that moral and spiritual experience which through man's long story has been beaten out in the travail of his soul; which is so deep there and so congenial as almost to merit the epithet 'human'; and which found, for the time being, matchless utterance among the prophets, singers, teachers of the ancient Hebrews.

Look, first, at Mr. Montefiore's human explication of that very chapter liii in Isaiah, his specifically Jewish explication of which we have already noticed.

> 'Whether the figure [in chapter liii] be Israel or no, the doctrine remains the same. Voluntary sacrifice for the sake of others: *their* spiritual healing through *his* voluntarily accepted pain. This is the finest palliative of suffering which human thought and human love have yet devised.'

Again, there is in Mr. Montefiore's book a section headed: 'The relation of Man to God according to the Old Testament.' He writes:

> 'More strictly this section should be entitled: "The relation of the Israelite to Yahweh." But we can generalise where the Old Testament particularises. If a valuable and beautiful relationship is set forth about Israel and Yahweh, we can at once turn Israel into humanity and Yahweh into God.'

Once more, who among us is not moved as he becomes aware of the dream, the enthusiasm, the fidelity of this modern preacher of Israel? Let us listen:

> 'The supreme revelations of the Hebrew Bible constitute the core of our Judaism, the core of our own religion, the core, as we believe, of the future religion of all mankind. We, too, can say of this book, as the gentile proselytes are to say of Zion, "All my fountains are in thee."'

(II) The book under review is *The Old Testament and After*: what does *After* mean? *After* means four developments of the Old Testament: (*a*) 'The Advance of the New Testament'; (*b*) 'The Advance in Rabbinic Literature'; (*c*) 'Hellenistic Contributions'; (*d*) 'Liberal Judaism.'

Now this present little paper, written by a Christian, is concerned almost entirely with development (*a*), the New Testament development. That is not to be guilty of the impertinence of disparagement concerning the other three developments. A writer may choose and limit his own subject. Moreover, development (*d*), the Liberal Judaic development, must necessarily, though incidentally, be in view of the present writer throughout, because Mr. Montefiore himself is root and branch a Liberal Jew and all he writes is written from that standpoint. Thus while Mr. Montefiore's object in his book is 'to set forth . . . . the religious foundations of Liberal Judaism as they may be gathered from the Old Testament,' the present writer's object, in this modest paper, is to strike a spark of light upon 'Mr. Claude Montefiore on the Old Testament and the New.'

(*a*) Mr. Montefiore's disposition towards the New Testament development is twofold: (1) assent, (2) dissent.

(1) It is a gain for religious truth and amity that a Jew should be of a mind so large, sympathetic, and frank as to perceive and avow in much of the New Testament an *advance* on the Old Testament. We had already learnt from Mr. Montefiore's *Synoptic Gospels* to expect from him this spacious candour; indeed, his leadership of the movement of Liberal Judaism stands, perhaps mainly, on this new Jewish appreciation of Christ. In *The Old Testament and After* the author again and again selects and elaborates great ethical teaching of Jesus, sometimes great theistic teaching, for acceptance and gratitude. 'Is it not wiser,' he asks, 'to push home our liberal doctrine that all light has not shone through Jewish windows, even if one of the other windows be a Christian one?' Here are a few rays of this 'light' shining through New Testament windows.

Mr. Montefiore finds in the ethical teaching of Jesus the baptism of fire:

> 'What strikes the impartial outsider as new and formative and original, are a certain spirit, a certain tone and temper, a certain fire and enthusiasm that breathe through the whole . . . . A pedestrian parallel may be quoted in vain: it does not and cannot derogate from the value and the greatness of the Gospel utterance.'

He has a fine appreciation of the famous dicta as to 'cutting off' the offending right hand, &c.:

'A man may have a hidden temptation or a secret sin which he can only overcome, not gradually, but suddenly. And he may only be able to overcome it suddenly by drastic methods . . . . It is in the spirit of Jesus to suggest heroic remedies as well as to make heroic demands. And Jowett urged: "No man ever took his besetting sin, it may be lust or pride, and, as it were, cut it out by voluntarily placing himself where to gratify it was impossible, without sensibly receiving a new strength of character. In one day, almost in an hour, he may become an altered man; he may stand, as it were, in a different stage of moral and religious life; he may feel himself in new relations to an altered world."'

He considers, though the word 'Father' as a name of God is rare in the Old Testament, that yet the Old Testament is permeated with the ideas underlying the name. Notwithstanding, he welcomes the word 'Father' in the frequent evangelical use.

'The metaphor of regarding God and invoking God as 'Our Father'—the father of all men equally, the father of each man individually—is undoubtedly of great value, and it would be foolish not to recognise the advance made by those who made the usage common.'

As to 'love' in the latter part of the New Testament, Mr. Montefiore quotes one or two great passages from the First Epistle of St. John, and asks:

'The solemn nobility and beauty of these words, who can gainsay? Are we not the poorer if we cannot accept them as part of the formative religious literature of the world and of our own religious consciousness? . . . Above all, can we afford to neglect the high paean of love in the First Epistle to the Corinthians?'

(2) Mr. Montefiore's dissent from the New Testament is, for Christians, very grave. His book is not directly concerned with controversy between Jews and Christians as such. 'Any discussion of that question lies entirely outside the scope of this book.' Yet throughout the volume incidentally that question arises. So we must notice it. Mr. Montefiore's dissent from the New Testament is, we say, momentous.

First, in one passage he seems to retract his apparent concession elsewhere that the New Testament is an advance on the Old.

'It by no means follows . . . that he considers either the Rabbinic literature or the New Testament to be greater than the Old Testament. . . . For though, in this doctrine or in that, the New Testament or the Rabbinic literature may show a development over the Old Testament, the religious value or originality of the Old Testament as a whole may well be greater than that of the other two.'

But secondly, and more decisively, he disowns—as probably, being a Jew (we speak with utmost courtesy), he feels urged,

almost compelled, to do—the whole Christian *differentia* of the New Testament, the whole dominant body of doctrine about Christ in the New Testament, what our English Bible, A.V. and R.V., means by 'The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.' He expresses his dissent here with unfailing charity, but he expresses it.

> 'When we pass from the Synoptic Gospels to the rest of the New Testament Scriptures, the doctrine about God becomes so closely connected with the doctrine about Christ that for our *own* purposes its value is diminished . . . . The New Testament does not, for the most part, contain what we, from our Liberal Jewish point of view, can regard as *completely new* doctrine which is *also true* doctrine.'
>
> 'I am well aware that in the purest and most philosophic presentation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, no infraction of the divine unity is intended . . . . Judaism, however, remains content with the unqualified doctrine of the Unity.'
>
> 'The great question for Liberal Judaism is: Can God supply the place both of Christ and of the Law?'

Mr. Disraeli was not, to our mind, by any means an ideal champion of Christianity. But he was an extraordinarily sage observer of mankind and of the events and tendencies of history. His judgment between Jew and Christian is classical. 'The Jews represent the Semitic principle, all that is most spiritual in our nature. . . . It is deplorable that several millions of Jews [by not becoming Christians] still persist in believing only a part of their religion.' We do not altogether like this saying of Disraeli. It is too clever, and has in it a taint of harshness, if not of cynicism. It is the epigram of a very comfortable Christian, and is unrelieved by a gleam of human pity. Contrast the pathos of Mr. Montefiore's lament: 'Meanwhile, Israel still spells sorrow and trouble; persecution and disdain; contempt and prejudice.' Yet, within the rather callous husk of Disraeli's dictum lies a kernel of rationality. The Jews have no monopoly of the Divine Unity, as Mr. Montefiore justly intimates. We all, Jews and Christians alike, stretch forth our hands towards the Divine Unity. The root question between us is whether mankind in its march toward belief in the One God will travel *viâ* Christianity, or *viâ* Judaism—along the line during near two thousand years of Jewish spiritual experience, or along the line during that same period of Christian spiritual experience. Specifically Christian experience, like specifically Jewish experience, through those centuries has not had hold of nothing; it has had hold

of something. That something is for Christians the supreme reality. The future course of humanity will prove whether they are right or wrong. Meanwhile, as the *Imitation* says: 'Totum Deo committe.'

We end this paper, which gives but a glimpse into the reviewed book, with three reflections. First, Mr. Montefiore speaks on his subject with a fulness of knowledge which puts the present writer, at least, to shame. Secondly, the present writer, with deference, does not hold Mr. Montefiore, though an eminent scholar, to be a master of style—in the sense in which, say, Dean Church and Lord Morley were masters. Yet his style has a beautiful naturalness of its own; it has sometimes a homeliness, sometimes a spontaneous dignity and eloquence, which are very attractive. Thirdly, if there is restraint in our appreciation of the form of his writing, when we come to the spirit of it our esteem knows no limit. Mr. Montefiore is a master of piety and goodness. He is at home among the monumental truths of religion which he affirms. He is a native of those sacred regions; he moves there easily and breathes familiar air. His book throughout is instinct with reverence and nobility, and whoso reads it becomes a wiser and a better man. As we close it, after intent perusal, we cherish towards the author a sentiment of profound respect and, if we may venture to say so, of affectionate admiration.

Shall we stop there? No. That would be to hide something; it would be to speak from behind a screen, not face to face. For consistency, therefore, not for importance, we must here make a short personal confession of faith. For us, Judaism does not *satisfy*. No Theism, as such, satisfies. What does satisfy? Well, it was once proposed that beneath a large picture of the Crucifixion should be placed this motto—*Adequate*. That is the present writer's creed. He finds that it is the Cross, and the Cross only, which, amid the riddle of things, sufficiently unlocks the gates of Significance and sets free the fountains of Strength. And so, let the storms of life whirl; let the mystery deepen; let temptations hiss and drive and troubles break your back—still at the foot of the Cross, and there alone, the present writer finds *enough*. '*O Jesu, splendor aeternae gloriae, silentium meum loquitur tibi.*'

REFLECTIONS ON AQUINAS

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., author of *Science and Religion from Galileo to Bergson.*

I. His Dualism.

'THE revival of interest in the philosophy and theology of Aquinas displayed by the more intellectual element in the Anglo-Catholic party is a fact of great significance. It means, or at least it should mean, that the philosophical foundations of Catholicism are being re-examined at the fountain-head by men of great practical ability and intense spiritual fervour,' so writes Mr. Richard Hanson in the Conference number of the *Modern Churchman.*[1]

Some twenty-seven years ago a recently revived intensity of interest in Aquinas had displayed itself in the Roman Church, and prompted George Tyrrell to write as follows to Baron von Hügel :—

> 'I cannot but think that if Aquinas were studied, not as an authority, but critically and historically as a genius, such a study would be in itself an invaluable instrument of ecclesiastical education. If the [neo-scholastic] movement could be deflected in this direction, it would be unto life and not unto death. In a word, I would study Aquinas as I would study Dante, in order that knowing the mind of another age we might know the mind of our own more intelligently.'[2]

The fact is that there are two ways of studying Aquinas. The one way is to ascribe to him literal inerrancy, and then piously and industriously to draw out the implications of the sacred text, as the Rabbis elaborated the *Torah.* The other way is to study him historically and 'critically' (the word is used in its technical sense of 'scientifically') as we would study the work of any other genius of past times.

It may be said that to study Aquinas thus is to display indifference to the truth of his message. But until an author *is* studied critically, it is impossible to understand accurately what his message is, for we shall not comprehend his ideas until we can understand his idiom. Nor is it a question only of idiom, but a question of *problems* as well : until we know what the problems are which a man sets himself to solve, what practical interest or value can his solutions have for us?

[1] p. 405.
[2] *Life of George Tyrrell,* Vol. II, p. 45.

The problem facing Aquinas was not in essentials different from that facing Christian thinkers to-day. There existed in his day, as there exists in ours, a system of scientific naturalism, to all appearances true, yet apparently involving implications hostile to certain vital Christian beliefs. The Middle Ages are so invariably thought of and spoken of as the 'ages of faith' that often the existence, still oftener the difficulty, of the problems with which Aquinas was faced, is overlooked. He is so apt to be regarded as a sort of codifier and elaborator of firmly-held and unchallenged beliefs, that it is forgotten that not only was this 'age of faith' a time of very deep questioning, but also that, had it not been for Aquinas, it might not have remained an age of faith at all. We have to remember that in the thirteenth century the prestige of Arabic culture was superior to that of European culture; and just as there was a very real danger of Europe being over-run by Mohammedan armies, so there was a danger of Christianity being overwhelmed by Mohammedan, or Graeco-Arabian, ideas. We may not have much to fear from the intellectual prestige of Islam to-day, but things were different in the thirteenth century. Champions like Raymond Lull and St. Thomas Aquinas faced the Islamic menace, and, thanks to them, it was vanquished; but it was a very serious and dubious conflict whilst it lasted.

Briefly the problem arose from Aristotle's teaching on psychology, ethics, sociology, physics, and metaphysics having been re-introduced into a Europe which had almost forgotten him after an exile of seven hundred years by Mussulman scholars who emphasised those aspects of the great philosopher's teaching which were least compatible with Christianity —*viz.* 'the eternity of matter' and 'the unity of the active intellect.' These obscure-sounding principles were equivalent to (1) the denial of 'creation,' and (2) the denial of personal immortality.

Aquinas was firmly convinced of the truth of Aristotelian science, and he resolved somehow to baptize it into Christ, so that scientific and religious culture might live together and strengthen one another—a noble and, need we add? an essentially 'modernist' ideal. And he realised it so well that he realised it almost too well; that is to say, his synthesis was regarded as canonical in the sense of being altogether beyond

criticism—so that, later, scholasticism became, or tended to become, an incubus upon Christian theology.

Aquinas solved his problem by asserting that besides the truths of science which human reason, unassisted, has reached, there are also truths inaccessible to human reason, though not contradictory to it; which truths could only be imparted to man by divine revelation. Thus there were two channels of truth, Reason and Revelation; though the truth was one, and its source one, *i.e.* God. The *rationale* of this point of view is put very clearly by M. Etienne Gilson in his *Le Thomisme*, an admirable translation of which, by Mr. Edward Bullough, has recently been published by Heffers, of Cambridge.

> 'If we consider, on the one hand, the truths which exceed our Reason, we shall see no less clearly that they had to be offered to the acceptance of our Faith. For the end of man is none other than God; but this end manifestly exceeds the limits of our Reason. Again, man must possess some knowledge of his end to be able to order his intentions and actions in relation to it. The salvation of man, therefore, demanded that the Divine Revelation should bring to his knowledge a certain number of truths which are incomprehensible to the Reason.'[3]

Closely connected with this distinction between Revelation and Reason is the distinction between Faith and Knowledge. Wherever Reason can find a foothold, Faith has no place: one cannot know and believe the same thing at the same time.[4] It is an essential part of the scheme of Aquinas that faith is *meritorious*. Nothing is meritorious but what is voluntary, and our assent to an unassailable intellectual proof is not voluntary but compelled. Belief may be as confident as Knowledge, but it is not the same thing. With Aquinas Belief does not imply any want of certainty; we may be as 'certain' of a thing we do not 'know' but 'believe,' as of something we do actually know. The 'certainty' is the same in degree in either case, but differs in origin. In the one case this is 'will,' in the other case 'compulsion.'[5]

The above theory of Reason and Revelation, Knowledge and Faith, while it upholds the unity of truth, yet involves a dualism in relation to the channels through which truth is derived. There is the 'natural' channel, Reason, and the 'super-

[3] Gibson, Eng. Trans., p. 22; reference to *Summa Theol.* I, i, i, ad *Resp. de virtutibus.*

[4] *Impossibile est quod de eodem sit fides et scientia.* (*Qu. disp.* de *Veritate,* qu. XIV.).

[5] See Wicksteed, *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy,* pp. 177 *ff.*

natural' channel, Revelation. This dualism permeates the system of Aquinas. As there are natural virtues, so there are supernatural virtues, and as there are natural events, so also there are supernatural events or miracles.

> 'His method was to draw a sharp line between the natural powers of man, with the truths accessible to them and the life that could be realised by them, on the one hand, and the powers beyond the scope of human nature, on the other hand, fed by truths inaccessible to reason, and leading to ideals of conduct and hopes of spiritual realisation unknown and unknowable to natural man.'[6]

The difficulty in all this for us to-day is that we are not in the habit of drawing sharp lines anywhere. For an example we may take the case of reason and revelation.

According to Aquinas, theology receives its *principia*, or axioms, through revelation; this being what differentiates theology from all other sciences, whose *principia* are derived from reason. Now these revealed axioms are the utterances of Scripture, which constitute a revelation supernaturally given and authenticated by miracle. But the modern attitude finds it difficult to discover any difference in *kind* between the revelation received by Isaiah, and that received by George Fox, or Mazzini, or even Copernicus or Darwin. We cannot say that the one is natural, the other supernatural; the one human, the other divine.

Or, to express the same idea in other terms, the modern man will admit that there exist different types of knowledge; the knowledge of a mathematical truth is different from the knowledge of an aesthetic or an ethical truth; but both kinds of knowledge are equally human (or equally divine); we no longer explain these differences in terms of an artificial dualism which really has no basis in experience.

Similarly, with our way of looking at the world and the events which take place in it. These events seem to differ very much from one another both in character and in value. Some are 'purely physical' events, like the fall of a stone; some are biological or psychological events, like the hen's behaviour towards her brood, or the apprehension of an important truth by a rational mind. These events differ in nature and significance; but they cannot be arbitrarily placed in either of the twin categories 'natural' or 'supernatural.' Reality indeed is

[6] Wicksteed, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

too manifold to fit into any artificial scheme even when it has been elaborated, as was the scheme of Aquinas, to conserve the highest spiritual values.

Indeed, the term 'natural' has expanded with our knowledge of nature, until he would be a bold man who would call anything 'supernatural'; for until we know the whole extent of nature, how can we say what lies outside it? To assert that an event has been supernaturally caused is to lay claim to omniscience.

Yet it is obviously true that the dualistic scheme of Aquinas would not have lasted so long had it not been consistent with facts, and especially with the facts of religious experience. The religious man has experience of 'another world,' of 'a power not himself making for righteousness,' of 'grace,' of 'intimations' of truths which seem to lie beyond reason. In fact, man, strange as it may seem, feels 'dependent' upon something outside himself; he feels called to do what he cannot accomplish, he has desires which he cannot satisfy, hopes which he can never realize. He has, as Kant said, a foot in either of two worlds. Like Carlyle's shoeblack, he cannot be made permanently happy by any quantity of material goods. St. Paul, Augustine, Pascal, to speak of no others, have told the same story, and it serves as the basis of every form of ethical and spiritual religion.

For St. Thomas this inadequacy of the 'natural' was compensated for by the infusion of the 'supernatural'—nature was redeemed by grace. The higher truths and higher virtues are incapable of being evolved by human nature until something that does not belong to it has been given it from above. And not only the vital germ, but the very capacity to receive and profit from it must also be added to the 'natural' man from outside, or 'from above.'

Yet here too there is an artificial simplification of the facts, which are too complex to fit into any rigidly dualistic theory. Or rather, to do Aquinas justice, he did not simplify the facts which he knew; it is our increasing knowledge which makes his view of the facts seem partial and inadequate. For although the modern view of man regards him as 'unfinished' and imperfect, yet it regards him as having been lifted from the simpler stage of organic life upon which the animals stand. And this involves the corollary that if our present 'imperfection' is being

redeemed from without by supernatural agency, it must have been the same supernatural agency which performed the earlier parts of the process and lifted us from the animal to our present human stage. The process, complete or incomplete, is one; and, if so, to call any stage of it 'supernatural' becomes incongruous; for if the *whole* process is 'supernatural,' it may equally well all be called 'natural'; for if the dualism goes, the distinction goes, and the whole process may be called natural or supernatural indifferently. What has created a man out of an animal also created a St. Francis out of a man—such is the modern view: and whether you call the creative force natural or supernatural does not seem to matter so long as the same term is used in either case.

Probably it would be true to say that the Thomist dualism of natural and supernatural has been replaced by the modern antithesis immanent and transcendent. Is the creative power *in* its processes and products only, or does it somehow work 'from outside' them? These are the sort of questions, presumably, that Mr. Hanson was thinking of when he said that what we wanted to-day was a logic of immanence. To embark upon problems of such dimensions is too much of an enterprise at the moment, but it might be suggested that the transcendent can only be known by us as immanent, so that the latter aspect is the more important from our point of view.

A further observation would not be irrelevant, which is that a doctrine of 'immanence' to-day is not equivalent to mere pantheistic naturalism. The variety of *stages* in natural phenomena—*e.g.* matter, life, mind—enable us to regard the immanent as 'revealed' in different degrees. And the *perfect* product of the immanent creative power would be equivalent to an 'incarnation' of that creative power. Here, as nowhere else, immanent and transcendent would be one.

In a subsequent article we hope to return to Aquinas in his relation to the authority of Scripture and the Church—the *fons et origo* of Revelation as distinct from Reason.

BISHOP GORE AS A CHRISTIAN APOLOGIST (I)

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BISHOP Gore is a great Christian and a great Christian teacher, and with his recent book on the Holy Spirit and the Church,[1] he completes his trilogy on the Reconstruction of Belief. When so influential a Christian teacher writes of such practically important subjects as the Holy Spirit and His work, the origin and nature of the Church, the Ministry and the Sacraments; the nature and scope of Biblical and ecclesiastical authority; and when he lays down what, in his opinion, is the content of the 'authoritative tradition of which the Church is set in charge' (p. 284), he is worthy of the most serious attention.

In this third volume, as in its two predecessors, Dr. Gore makes no appeal to authority, but proceeds by the method of critical inquiry. Much is said of the necessity of thinking freely and of the harm which results when evidence is approached with presuppositions, especially negative presuppositions. This is quite as it should be; but we read also of 'so wide a conspiracy of our intellectuals, refusing dogmatically to take into consideration anything but a non-miraculous and purely humanitarian conception of Christ' (p. 330 f). Indeed throughout his three volumes, Dr. Gore frequently suggests that critics[2] who hold modernist views are precluded by an *a priori* philosophy, or by some less reasonable prejudice, from acknowledging that the traditional presentation of Christianity can conceivably be true. The precise opposite is really the case. Dr. Gore must be aware that, at least in our own Church, there are many modernist or liberal scholars, like the late Dr. Sanday, who for years maintained a theological position similar to that of Bishop Gore, and accepted as sufficient the arguments he still propounds, but who have gradually, and at the time reluctantly, found that position to be untenable. The point is that all the presuppositions of these scholars were favourable

[1] *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, by Charles Gore, D.D., formerly Bishop of Oxford. (London: John Murray, 1924. Price 7/6 net.)

[2] The word usually appears in inverted commas.

to traditional conclusions. The fact that Bishop Gore never mentions this, but persistently implies the opposite, does not increase our confidence in the strict impartiality of Bishop Gore.

I.

Bishop Gore begins by summarizing that view of 'the religion of the Spirit' which results from the comparative study of religions and of anthropology. It leads us 'to entertain the idea of religion as in all its phases and varieties essentially one,' and 'throughout the whole process there is an awakening and realizing within the man of his fellowship with divine spirit' (p. 3), which is available for man without regard to any particular institution (p. 4). The difference between this view and the Scriptural view Dr. Gore finds 'somewhat startling.' He says that although in the Old Testament the Spirit of God is sometimes represented as universal in its action, yet it came to be almost reserved for the action of God in the redemption of Israel. In this reserved sense the idea passed into the New Testament (pp. 8 and 98), where the Spirit is regarded as a gift given from outside under definite and objective conditions (p. 7). Bishop Gore, however, does not wish to emphasize the contrast between the Scriptural and the modern view; he quotes a number of passages which show a conception of an universal divine activity among men, and admits that the later Church refused to limit to Christians the operation of the Spirit; but he emphasizes that in the New Testament this universal activity is that of the Word or Logos, whereas the operation of the Spirit 'is exclusively associated with Christ and His Church' (p. 9, cf. pp. 16 f.). We should wish the following points to be noted.

(*a*) The contrast between the Scriptural and the modern view can only be maintained if in the New Testament there is a sharp and even rigid distinction or difference between the Logos or the exalted Christ and the Spirit. We feel that at most all that can be said is that the New Testament does not expressly identify 'the Lord' and 'the Spirit,' and even this much is doubtful. The Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus and is Christ's presence with His disciples after His bodily presence is withdrawn (*John* xiv. 16-18). But even if Dr. Gore's exegesis of passages emphasizing the distinction between Christ and the Spirit be accepted, it does not seem that the distinction is much more

than a verbal one. For is there any difference *in experience* underlying the words 'in Christ' and 'in the Spirit' when, as Dr. Gore admits, 'to be "in the Spirit" is to be "in Christ"' (p. 114), or in passages which speak of Christ dwelling in the heart, or of Christians having the Spirit of Christ? Can the activities of the Logos and of the Spirit be sharply distinguished either in the world or in our own hearts? We suggest that the absence of any such distinction offers an explanation of the fact that 'all down the history of the Church the Holy Spirit is comparatively little spoken of,' which Dr. Gore finds 'difficult to account for' (p. 118).

(*b*) Bishop Gore does not attempt to deny the truth of the facts revealed by the study of comparative religion and anthropology, or that the modern view of 'the religion of the Spirit' is correctly deduced from them. He merely says there is little about it in the New Testament. But the facts raise problems which cannot so easily be set aside. What is the relation of the divine activity in mankind generally, be it Logos or Spirit, to the divine activity in the Christian Church? Or what is the relation of the Logos in mankind generally to the Logos in Christ? Dr. Gore shelves these problems,[3] of which it seems to us imperative that modern theologians should take account. He says we are all agreed as to what life in the Spirit is. 'It is to be possessed . . . by an inward power and presence greater than ourselves . . . God working in us' (p. 2). The differences arise when we pass from the practical consideration of 'the fruit of the Spirit' to the consideration of the methods by which and conditions under which the Spirit works (p. 2). But surely the judgment by fruits is the supreme standard, never to be set aside by the wholly subsidiary consideration of conditions and methods in and by which the fruits were brought about in the early Church.

Dr. Gore says very little about the theology of the Holy Spirit in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, as this has been dealt with in Chapter VIII in *Belief in Christ*. He tells us that 'the subtle and profound conception' of the Holy Spirit as 'personally distinct' from the ascended Christ is due to St.

[3] The vague phrase, 'the Covenant of Salvation does not represent the whole action of God' (p. 30), is at best only a partial statement of a problem.

Paul and that it may have come into his mind by an internal revelation (p. 112 f.). It seems to us that neither here nor in his previous volume does Bishop Gore offer any convincing arguments, based on the New Testament, to show that 'person' in anything like its usual sense must be applied to the Holy Spirit, and it is this particular application of the word which causes so much difficulty. And Bishop Gore himself recognizes that for well over three hundred years the Church had no definite belief on the matter, for he quotes the saying of Gregory of Nazianzus—'Of the wise men among us some considered the Spirit as an activity, some as a creature, some as God' (p. 119).

II.

Dr. Gore proceeds to examine whether Christ founded a Church and equipped it with sacraments and a ministry. The examination of the evidence is prefaced by 'considerations which may serve in some measure to disarm prejudice and make the idea and principle of the Church at least more intelligible' (p. 27). Among these 'considerations' we find the statement, 'Nothing in Christianity could have kept believers in Christ together except the positive obligation of the one body—the obligation of membership by baptism, grace by sacraments, adherence to the apostolic ministry' (p. 27). In point of fact, history shows that it has been necessary to resort to force to keep Christians together in this corporate unity—*sed frustra*. Moreover, 'the idea and principle of the Church' is in itself quite intelligible, and its intelligibility has no bearing whatever on the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence that Jesus actually founded such a Church. Unless the purpose of such 'considerations' is to induce us to accept weaker evidence than we should otherwise demand, it is difficult to understand why they so often preface Dr. Gore's examination of evidence.

Dr. Gore believes, not that Jesus actually *founded* the Church, but rather that He *refounded* the already existing Jewish Church under a new covenant and endowed it with sacraments and an authoritative ministry. In other words, from the point of view of a first century orthodox Jew, He formed a schism in the Jewish Church. The Bishop criticises a statement of Dean Inge that 'the expectation of a speedy end of the world renders absurd the idea of Christ having legis-

lated for the Church' (p. 40), by arguing that St. Paul in I *Corinthians* shows himself as a zealous organizer and as one who builds for the future. The argument is an extremely weak one. Whereas there is somewhat in I *Corinthians* which is only really practicable if the end was near, there is nothing in it which shows St. Paul as 'building for the future.' Dr. Gore should distinguish between the Apostle's insistence on moral principles and conduct—for no one would dream of suggesting that a high standard of moral life was inconsistent with the Apocalyptic belief of the early Christians—and legislation about such matters as the future of a self-perpetuating ministry, of which St. Paul says nothing in I *Corinthians* and which would have been inconsistent with the Apocalyptic beliefs he then held.

Undoubtedly if Jesus believed any religious movement to continue after His death, His training of the Twelve was certainly in order that they should take the leading part in it. That He in any other or more definite sense constituted them 'rulers,' the evidence is flimsy in the extreme. The only passages of weight are among the most dubious in the first Gospel, which Gospel Bishop Gore is wisely willing to regard as exhibiting later ecclesiastical tendencies when it comes to the Matthean exception of adultery in the Marcan absolute prohibition of divorce. And even the passages as they stand are often expounded in a more natural sense than that in which Bishop Gore expounds them, by commentators whom he could not accuse of Modernism. These expositions, and the more obvious difficulties attending his own, he does not even notice. Thus of the 'rock' passage in *Matt.* xvi, he merely says in a footnote 'the rock is surely the *person*' (p. 48 n.) an exposition which such an authoritarian as St. Augustine regarded as senseless and blasphemous. Elsewhere Dr. Gore admits that actually the Church was founded on the confession of the Messiahship of Jesus. If our Lord actually used the words in *Matt.* xvi. 17-19 of St. Peter, and bestowed upon him the power of binding and loosing, the immediately subsequent dispute among the disciples as to who should be the greatest becomes well-nigh unintelligible, and hardly less so the request of James and John for the seats on His right and left hand in His Kingdom. And why should Peter subsequently ask what they should have who had forsaken all to follow Jesus, if our Lord had constituted

him the rock upon which a future society should be built against which the gates of Hades should not prevail? Bishop Gore seems to accept the general view that the prominence of Peter in the first Gospel is due to the Jewish-Christian tendency to make James chief of the apostles (p. 51). But if Jesus had ever spoken of Peter in such definite terms as Dr. Gore would maintain to be the case, the real difficulty is to understand why any such tendency should have arisen in Jewish-Christian circles, for St. Peter did not become pre-eminently the apostle of the *Gentiles*. Nor is it convincing to find in Bishop Gore's explanation of the fact that so little about apostolic authority is found in St. Luke's Gospel, a statement that the evangelist, being pressed for space, probably felt that 'enough about apostolic authority appeared in *Acts*' (p. 51), an 'argument' which would be of only very little use if we knew that St. Luke had all his material for *Acts* already set in order when he wrote 'the former treatise,' a matter about which we know nothing. Certainly in *Acts* the apostles are in chief authority in the Church, but who should be in that position if not those who had known Jesus most intimately? Similarly there is no mistaking St. Paul's note of authority in his Epistles, but who should so write if not the actual founder of most of the Churches he addresses, and above all he who had fought for the Gentiles' inclusion in the Church? Again, Bishop Gore argues that there is no room to doubt St. Paul's conviction 'that the apostles and he among them, were endowed with disciplinary authority as rulers'; that the apostolate was of Christ's creation 'the same in the case of St. Paul as in that of the original Twelve' (p. 70); and that St. Paul held that our Lord 'had in fact equipped His Church with officers.' If St. Paul really held that all this was so by institution of Jesus while on earth, it is strange that he never mentions it, but always includes 'apostles' in his lists of spiritual gifts (I *Cor.* xii, 28; *Eph.* iv, 11), and never indicates that they, any more than the 'helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues,' were appointed by Jesus.[4] Nor can we doubt that St. Paul's clear statements in *Galatians* that his apostleship was neither from man nor through men decisively indicate that he

[4] In *Eph.* iv it is abundantly clear that St. Paul is thinking of apostleship as among the gifts of Christ given 'when He ascended up on high.' He misquotes the O.T. in order to make it harmonize with his own thought.

would never have admitted his office to have been in any way dependent on the other apostles, still less dependent on their ordination of him by the laying on of their hands. And it should be remembered that *Galatians* is quite probably the earliest of the Pauline writings. Dr. Gore argues (p. 68) that of 'the transmission of power supposed to be Peter's to his successors' there is no hint in the New Testament. But equally there is no hint, in that source, of any injunction of Jesus to the apostles to pass on authority in any way whatever, while the fact that the eschatological hope of the early Church was such as to make the death of any one of their fellow-Christians before the Second Advent 'a shock to them' (p. 39), seems decisive against the belief that Jesus can have given any such injunction. The fact of divine authority for the transmission of divine authority cannot be proved; and this is just what must be proved before it can be maintained that Jesus equipped His Church with officers who possessed divine authority as rulers.

III.

Turning to the question of Sacraments, Bishop Gore contends vigorously that those of Baptism and the Eucharist were instituted by Christ who definitely intended them to be permanent. Here again, the evidence adduced seems to fall far short of justifying historically the Bishop's tone of certainty. That the baptism 'unto remission of sins' was begun by John Baptist, and is continued in *Acts*, hardly proves that Jesus instructed His disciples to administer it. While admitting the use of the Three-fold Name in baptism (*Matt.* xxviii, 19) is unlikely to have been used by Jesus, Dr. Gore believes the accompanying command to baptize and make disciples of all nations is probably genuine and authentic. But why then in *Acts* is a special vision necessary to instruct Peter that Gentiles might enter the Christian Church? If our Lord ever gave such a definite statement of the universalism of His Gospel, and if He 'took over the ceremony of washing, *freed from animal sacrifices and circumcision*,[5] as the ceremony of initiation into the new Israel' (p. 54), why was there ever any Jewish-Gentile controversy at all? Why was the one fact which could have settled

[5] Italics ours.

the matter never appealed to? And why, if Jesus gave this command to Apostles, did St. Paul declare that he was sent 'not to baptize'? (I *Cor.* i, 17). It seems to us more reasonable to suppose that 'baptism unto the remission of sins,' to which Jesus submitted, never really ceased during His ministry and was naturally carried over into the primitive Christian Church, where it is primarily of the same character, though practised in the name of the Messiah who was greater than John. The case of Cornelius proves conclusively that although the gift of the Spirit generally followed incorporation into the Christian Church which was effected through baptism, the gift was not indissolubly tied to the rite of baptism. This—and not as Bishop Gore argues at length, that Jesus was not an anti-sacramentalist—is the really important point. Moreover, the idea of spiritual grace being restricted in its operation by the performance of outward rites is contrary to the whole of the recorded teaching of Jesus. All that we can say for certain is that Jesus approved the baptism of John by submitting to it.

For Christ's institution of the Eucharist, Dr. Gore feels the evidence to be 'much more direct and indisputable' (p. 54). When St. Paul claims for his teaching in this matter that it was received 'from the Lord,' this means, says Dr. Gore, from the Lord 'as its source,' but through the other apostles. We fail to see that the case is parallel to St. Paul's narrative of the Resurrection Appearances (I *Cor.* xv), in which the words 'from the Lord' do not occur, particularly as St. Paul declares elsewhere of his Gospel that he neither received it from man nor was he taught it by man, but through a revelation of Jesus Christ (*Gal.* i, 18). Nor has Dr. Gore any convincing reasons to set against the textual evidence that the crucial words, 'Do this in remembrance of me,' which occur in the Gospel narratives only in the Third, almost certainly did not form part of the original text of that Gospel;[6] while the favourite theory that certain things are not recorded in the Gospels because they were too well known is really futile, for, like St. Luke, probably all the Evangelists wrote with the definite object that converts might know the certainty of those things wherein they had been instructed. Bishop Gore admits that the early Christians would not sharply distinguish between what Christ was ordaining in

[6] Cf. *Belief in Christ*, p. 101.

heaven and His acts and words on earth; yet, he adds, 'the latter remained determinative' (p. 60). We were aware that with some difficulty it is possible to deduce from St. Paul's letters that he was acquainted with the life of Jesus, but Dr. Gore assures us that 'it is especially apparent in the writings of the apostle who had not companied with Him' that 'the greatest stress was evidently laid on His acts and words on earth' (p. 61). While the present writer is of the opinion that Jesus probably did at the Last Supper what the Gospels represent Him as doing, including the injunction which we have in St. Paul (I *Cor.* xi, 24) and in some codices of St. Luke, that it should be repeated in remembrance of Him, he cannot agree that the evidence is such as to justify Bishop Gore's assertion that it is 'arbitrary in a high degree to doubt it' (p. 55).

Very instructive is Dr. Gore's chapter on the influence of the Mystery Religions on early Christianity. Confessedly 'Christianity "borrowed" from Greek philosophy,' and the process is beginning in St. Paul, the author of *Hebrews*, and in *St. John*, and is more marked in the early Apologists (p. 74). The Bishop has no desire to minimize the existence of ideas closely akin to the Christian thought of Incarnation and Redemption. Since he 'cannot see any possible source' of Christ's language about the Eucharist 'except in the sacrificial language of the Jews,' Bishop Gore admits that Christian sacramental ideas have their ultimate origin in the common stock of human religion. He tells us that Jesus never repudiated the principle of animal sacrifices, which 'presumably He regarded as a divinely sanctioned institution which demanded fulfilment' (p. 57).[7] The conversion of pagan into Christian festivals is also admitted. But Bishop Gore argues that in its idea of God, and of a purpose in history, and in ethical content, Christianity was sharply distinguished from the Mysteries and owes nothing of importance to them, though in sacramentalism there was 'habit and principle' common to both. On the whole, it seems to us that this important question must be left where Dr. Gore leaves it unless and until further evidence is forthcoming. But we should wish to stress, more than is usually done, that the

[7] It is interesting to note that later (p. 259) Bishop Gore writes: 'The Epistle to the Hebrews is right about the sacrificial system. It was really essentially futile.'

argument very largely depends on the previous conviction that the Eucharist as it appears in St. Paul adds nothing to Christ's institution of or intention concerning it. If, in St. Paul, its form has been developed to any extent by a spiritual revelation, it would be impossible any longer to doubt the source of his language. And it must be confessed that 'the breaking of the bread' in the earlier chapters of *Acts* (not at Troas) does not appear to have anything approaching the deep sacramental significance of the Gospel accounts of the 'institution' if these are interpreted in the language of St. Paul. Moreover, 'the breaking of the bread' does not appear to be 'sacrificial' at all, much less to fulfil or supersede the Temple worship in which the early Church still joined. It appears to have been a rite of fellowship and of thanksgiving celebrated in the spirit of the early Eucharistic prayers in the *Didache*.

IV.

Of the vexed questions concerning ecclesiastical authority Dr. Gore has many things to say to which we could wish that those who claim him as their theologian would pay diligent heed. 'The traditionalist and the protestant, the conservative and the radical, the disciplinarian and the prophet, are each needed in the world and in the Church, and each in due measure have their gift from God' (p. 152). He also protests against the attitude which says 'the Church teaches' and which will not allow what is taught to make its own appeal to the conscience. Our Lord accepted the authority of the Jewish Church, though His acceptance of it was far from being unconditional (p. 156)—a very mild statement of the attitude which Dr. Gore often expresses elsewhere as setting aside the authority of the Jewish Church and re-constituting it under new governorship. But 'in the main, His teaching was moral' (p. 158). 'Now the primacy of the moral appeal has been lamentably forgotten and its nature distorted,' and of this theological controversy has been a contributing cause (158 *f*). 'The most pressing call upon the Church to-day is to remember that its authority and mission rest simply upon the word of God, and that this is first of all a challenge to a new life—a difficult but glorious life' (p. 160). This is followed by admirable expositions of the manner of our

Lord's teaching. 'We cannot imagine our Lord giving a dogmatic lesson about the Trinity or about any subject remote from the conscience and thoughts of His hearers, and forcing it upon their acceptance by a miraculous proof' (p. 164). Dr. Gore might as truly have said that equally we cannot imagine Him taking part in a Council of Bishops, some of whom could neither read nor write, but who decided by vote the deepest questions in the relation of God to man, and made their decisions obligatory upon all who should claim to be disciples of Jesus. And if, as the Bishop says, St. Paul would not have us put 'the religion of the Spirit' into contrast with 'the religions of authority, this is because for St. Paul the only religion of authority was 'the religion of the Spirit.' While he insists that 'the principle of authority must be recognized as lying at the root of all stable human progress' (p. 182), Bishop Gore also emphasizes that throughout the New Testament the conception of authority is strictly limited. 'They (St. Paul and St. John) seem to assume that genuine goodness and acceptance of the truth even in this world will be found together,' and they have 'a robust confidence that the good man will come to a right conclusion' (p. 171). This is the ideal.

As for the authority claimed by the Roman Church, though he expresses his admiration for certain aspects of that Church, Bishop Gore does not mince matters. Rome has been 'on many points, and not chiefly in virtue of decrees for which infallibility is claimed, the great misleader of Europe' (p. 195), and the maintenance of the Roman claim 'has involved a constant perversion of the truth' (p. 203), largely due to the claim that 'the Church and Bible have authority in matters of science and that inductive reasoning from the observation of nature cannot be free when it appears to conflict with statements in the Bible' (p. 195), and also because of 'that far larger body of authoritative pronouncements which stifle criticism and resistance, but which after the lapse of time may turn out to have been confessedly mistaken' (p. 196). We could wish that more of Dr. Gore's professed followers would express themselves in an equally clear and unambiguous manner on a matter of no small importance to the Church of England at this time.

(*To be concluded in our next issue.*)

OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION

By Rev. John Todd, M.A., Rector of Waterstock, Oxon.

WHAT was the nature of our Lord's resurrection? The *fact* of the resurrection is one thing, the *method* of that resurrection is another. Was the tomb left empty? Was His body actually touched and handled by His disciples? Did He eat a piece of fried fish in their presence after the Resurrection? (*Luke* xxiv, 43). Or, on the other hand, was the Resurrection something not physical but spiritual, a spiritual experience which convinced the disciples that their Lord had survived death and was present among them? The former is the view of the Gospels; the latter that of St. Paul. It is the Gospel-view which is set forth in such uncompromising terms in the Fourth Article. 'Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body with flesh, bones and all things appertaining to the perfection of Man's nature.' That Jesus Christ survived death, that He manifested Himself to His disciples, that He is present to-day in the hearts of men, we are convinced. But that Christ took again His body and flesh and bones is, we believe, a later and unhistorical tradition.

Belief in the 'bodily' resurrection has, however, its defenders, and a little book[1] by the Rev. F. G. Pollard has recently been published in defence of this view. With the greater part of Mr. Pollard's book we are not concerned, for the greater part is irrelevant to his thesis. The book, as the sub-title tells us, deals with 'Evidences for the bodily resurrection of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.' But what evidence for a *bodily* resurrection can spiritual experience supply? What has the existence of the Church, Sunday, Easter, the Holy Eucharist, to do with a *bodily* resurrection? Most surprising of all, why does the author call upon the conversion of St. Paul to support this materialistic view? Surely St. Paul's evidence is our main reason for believing that the Resurrection was not something physical, but something spiritual. We can set aside, therefore, the greater part of this book as irrelevant, and deal only with Chapters II and III, which discuss the empty tomb.

[1] *On the Third Day.* (Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co., 2/6.)

To prove the tomb was empty, Mr. Pollard relies on the story, or stories, of the Resurrection as given by the four Gospels. But can we read the Gospels in such a naïve, uncritical fashion as Mr. Pollard's method would suggest? If we try to extract from the Gospels a coherent account of the Resurrection, it will quickly be evident that they cannot be taken at their face value, for they appear to contradict one another on almost every conceivable detail. Did the women go to the tomb in order to anoint the body of Jesus (Mark), or merely to look at the sepulchre (Matthew)? When they arrived at the tomb, was it closed (Matthew) or was it open (Mark)? Did they remain outside of the tomb (Matthew and John), or did they enter (Mark and Luke)? Did they see a young man, or two men, or an angel, or two angels? All four Gospels differ on this point. Did the Lord appear to Mary Magdalene as she stood outside the tomb (John), or to the women as they were going away from the tomb (Matthew), or was there no such appearance to the women (Mark[2] and Luke)? Were the women commanded to tell the disciples to go to Galilee, where they should see their Master (Matthew and Mark), or did Jesus appear to the disciples at once in Jerusalem (Luke and John)? Did the women deliver their message to the disciples (Matthew and Luke), or did they say nothing to anyone (Mark)?

These are by no means the only discrepancies, but they are numerous enough to show how impossible it is to take the Gospel records at their face value. True, it is sometimes urged that such disagreements show an absence of collusion. But surely disagreements, so many and so varied, show not the absence of collusion but the presence of legend.

The fact is, before we can use our Gospels as historical records of the Resurrection we must treat them as we should any other ancient documents. We must compare and contrast them, scrutinizing them carefully for marks of 'tendency' and traces of 'apologetic,' and take into account the fact that they were written in an age which had not attained to the same sensitiveness to historical truth as our own. In short, we must go back not *to* the Gospels, but *behind* the Gospels, if we would get at the original facts of the story. This method may be difficult and

[2] *Mark* xvi, 8-20, is not part of the original Gospel of S. Mark. See Revised Version. It was probably composed about 140 A.D.

indeed precarious, but it is the only way of dealing with ancient documents. If we follow this method we shall cease to worry about the difficulties of harmonizing the four Resurrection-narratives, for we shall realize that many details of the story are legendary accretion which has gathered round a kernel of fact. It may be the Gospels record not so much what took place about the year 29 A.D., as what, a generation later, was believed to have taken place about the year 29 A.D.

Fortunately, in the case of the Resurrection-story, we can get behind the Gospel-records to an earlier tradition. St. Paul wrote the First Epistle to the Corinthians possibly thirty years before St. Luke's Gospel appeared in its present form. In the fifteenth chapter he speaks about the appearance of Christ to himself and to others. 'He appeared to Cephas; then to the twelve; then He appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then He appeared to James; then to all the apostles; and last of all, as unto one born out of due time, He appeared to me also.' St. Paul has not one word to say about an empty tomb or a bodily resurrection. On the contrary, to him the Resurrection meant not the resurrection of a corpse, but a vision of Christ (ὤφθη)—not something material, but something spiritual. The empty tomb, the visit of the women to the tomb, the appearance to the women—all of which play the most prominent part in the Gospel stories of the Resurrection—are not even mentioned by St. Paul. The inference is that he knew nothing about them because they had not, at that time, become part of the traditional story of the Resurrection. St. Paul saw a vision, and that vision convinced him that Jesus had triumphed over death and was with His disciples in spiritual form.

But the idea that Christ was alive and had manifested His presence to His disciples, though not possessed of a physical body, was difficult to grasp. As the years rolled on and the story was discussed and argued between early Christians and their opponents, legends began to arise, and thoughts about the manner of the Resurrection, first put forward, it may be, as suggestions, began to solidify into statements of fact. Perhaps St. Luke's extraordinary statement that the risen Lord ate a piece of fried fish did actually help to convince opponents in those days that Christ lived, but to-day such a materialistic

addition can be little else than a stumbling block. By the time the Fourth Gospel was written the original tradition and the later legends seem to have become so inextricably mixed up that the writer of that Gospel makes no attempt to distinguish them. He gives a story which combines the idea of a spiritual resurrection with that of a bodily resurrection. Christ appears and disappears as a vision, but to give greater reality to the story, and perhaps to impress especially the Docetists, who denied that the Lord had come at all in the flesh, the writer adds such details as: 'He showed unto them his hands and his side,' and 'Reach hither thy hand and put it into my side.' The counter-effect of this Docetic heresy is also seen in the writings of Ignatius. Writing to the Smyrnaeans about 115 A.D., he says: 'For I know and believe that He was in the flesh even after the Resurrection; and when He came to Peter and his company, He said to them, "Lay hold and handle me, and see that I am not a demon without a body." And straightway they touched Him . . . And after His resurrection He ate with them and drank with them, as one in the flesh.'[3] These two things, the difficulty of thinking of the risen Christ without a physical body and the fear of the Docetic heresy which denied that Jesus Christ had ever had a physical body, made easy the rise of legendary details about a bodily Resurrection. We owe much to St. Luke and to St. John, but when we compare their views of the Resurrection with the earlier view of St. Paul, we cannot but feel that these writers have departed from the primitive tradition by the addition of unhistorical details.

It would seem that the earliest tradition, before St. Mark's Gospel was written, knew nothing of an empty tomb. St. Mark's, the earliest Gospel, tells us that the tomb was empty. Therefore, between St. Paul's conversion and the appearance of St. Mark's Gospel the story of the empty tomb must have arisen. St. Mark alone of the four evangelists says that the women, who discovered that the tomb was empty, said nothing about it. Perhaps this touch was added to explain why, in his opinion, the earliest tradition contained no mention of an empty tomb.

St. Paul believed that Christ was alive because he and others, like St. Stephen, had had visions of Christ. The evange-

[3] *Epistle to the Smyrnaeans*, 3.

lists believed that Christ was alive because they believed that the tomb was empty. It was the latter tradition which drew to itself the legendary details of a bodily resurrection, and, in course of time, well-nigh ousted the earlier view. 'The empty tomb,' said De Pressensé, 'was the cradle of the Church.' That is good rhetoric but bad history. Is it not truer to say that the Church was founded, not upon an empty tomb, but upon a spiritual experience? No man ever had a more intense faith in the Resurrection than St. Paul. If his faith was independent of a legendary story, ours can be equally independent of that story. If he built his faith on spiritual experience, surely ours can need no other foundation.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELATIONS OF EAST AND WEST*

Our American cousins, whatever their attitude to the League of Nations may be, are not backward in the endeavour to bring about better national inter-relations. Examples of this may be seen in the Kahn Travelling Scholarship, due to the munificence of an American millionaire, and in the Earl Lectures which are the subject of this review.

Professor Anesaki, their author, is a well-known Japanese man of learning, and these lectures, though slight, are in every way worthy of his great erudition and sympathetic outlook on both East and West. In this latter respect he differs from the more detached and critical outlook of his predecessor, Professor Lowes Dickenson, of Cambridge, who made the Khan grand tour in 1912-13. The Englishman's great point seems to be that the three nations of the Orient, India, China and Japan, differ quite as much among themselves as any one of them individually does from the West. This Professor Anesaki appears to deny, for he tells us in his preface that Japan may be taken as fairly typical of other Eastern countries, the foremost difference being in her political status. Professor Lowes Dickenson for his part, saw a totally different mentality in each of the three nations mentioned. We confess that the latter view appeals to us as the more probable, though our author would seem to have had better opportunities of judging, seeing that he is the author of at least one book on Buddhism. It is a point on which we shall look with interest for fuller information.

Apart from this single criticism we much confess that we prefer Professor Anesaki's point of view and method of treatment to that adopted by Professor Lowes Dickenson. The latter has too much of the hypercritical aloofness of the immediate pre-war age—probably he would be the first to admit this in our sadly disillusioned post-war era. Professor Anesaki, on the other hand, though very critical of both East and West, is yet so in the spirit of a surgeon who has to perform a delicate operation. Moreover, he is a good surgeon in that he inspires his patients with confidence which may help us, both in the East and the West, to accept some of his hard sayings anent our respective civilizations. But he is not wholly or even

* *The Religious and Social Problems of the Orient,* by Prof. Anesaki. (New York. Macmillan, 1922.)

mainly critical. On the contrary, he strives to show that the future is full of promise for the whole of mankind if only the Western idea of activity can but be interfused with the Oriental idea of contemplation.

> 'Here we may pause and ask whether the attitude of contemplation should be limited to the Orient only and whether activity is the final word in the progress of mankind. . . . The modern world is full of hopes in spite of the war. But are those hopes well sustained by faith, the faith in the unseen reality which furnishes the reservoir and refuge of life? In other words, does not the modern man, immersed in activities, crave something of restful repose, dignified self-possession, worshipful contemplation? Expressed in Christian terms, man is the centre or consummation of creation and he is a free personality; but man has the source of his being and activity in God and seeks to find the final refuge in Him. If this is so, Christian faith may be reduced to an attitude of devotion and not wholly one of activity. I do not mean to denounce, as Tolstoi did, modern life as entirely unchristian, but I do wish to say that not all individual initiatives and free activities are genuinely Christian. To reconstruct modern society means to Christianise it in the real sense, and in order to Christianise life everyone must go back to the source of divine inspiration, which stands in large letters at the beginning of the Johannine Gospel' (p. 14).

Here we have the gist of his criticism as it affects us Westerns. In this he would seem to be re-echoing the thought of William Temple when he said:

> 'We can hardly even imagine a social organisation governed by the principle of redemptive sacrifice, and there are nations to whom these thoughts are not great strangers. . . . When the East is converted and has given to us its power of mystic contemplation, raised to the highest pitch by union with Christ; when Africa is converted and has given us the treasure of its child-like affection and devotion, raised to its highest pitch by contact with Christ, then will come back to us from converted India and converted Africa the power which may enable us to complete the work of making England into a province of the Kingdom of God.'

Turning to the more concrete side of his work, we imagine it to lie chiefly in making known to the West the true significance of its impact on the East, and so, by dispelling our prejudices and awakening our sympathies, to render possible the realisation of the ideal mentioned above. Passages might be quoted from almost anywhere in this stimulating little book to exemplify this. We will only quote one which seems to be peculiarly appropriate just now in view of the recent Modern Churchmen's Conference. On p. 13 the author writes:

> 'The Middle Ages of Europe exhibited such manifestations of activity as the domination of the Church, the struggles of the princes, and the adventures of the Crusades, yet the general attitude of life and mentality therein was that of worshipful contemplation of what was believed God-ordained, such as the Church, the laws, the dogmas and the structure of the universe. Accordingly, it was quite natural that those whose ideas seemed destined to break up the established order, like Galileo or Giordano Bruno, were regarded as heretical and were punished.'

Of course our author does not use these words in any polemical sense, but one cannot help noticing their exceeding appositeness at the moment. It is just the same fear that new ideas are necessarily destined to break

up old-established order and institutions that causes so much uneasiness in the minds of many devout people at the present time. Now as then, however, that fear is only very slightly justified and, in so far as it is justified at all, it is probably only so on account of unreasonable and fearful opposition. Prof. Anesaki, let us hasten to add, draws none of these inferences. He shows that the contemplativeness of mediaeval times has within the past hundred years been exchanged for an activity without a *leit-motif*, and that the war was but its natural outcome.

The book can be confidently recommended to everyone who has the world situation at heart, though it will probably prove unsatisfying to partisan-minded men. Of course the reader will not find therein any cut and dried solution of any or all the problems which confront East and West: the writer does not set out to give them to us. As he says in his preface:

> 'The problem of the world to-day is not a simple abstract matter of race or creed. The author has sought in these lectures to point out some of the complications involved in the problem, not aiming at its solution but presenting the situation in its latest phases as seen from the standpoint of the Orient chiefly.'

Nevertheless, we are sure that no one who spends time or money on attaining the knowledge that this book has to offer will feel himself the loser, and we thank both Prof. Anesaki who has given it to us and the Trustees of the Earl Foundation and others who made it possible.

J.D.C.

THE THIRD WAVE.*

Christianity has met and survived the attacks of physicist and geologist and the far more formidable onset of biology. It has now to face the psychologist with his contention that Christian experience, the innermost stronghold of those for whom an infallible Bible and an infallible Church are alike no more, is in reality nothing but phantasy and illusion. The attack from the side of psychology is aptly described by Mr. Balmforth as the third wave, a wave which bids fair to surpass its predecessors in force and volume.

At the heart of Christianity stands the affirmation that God is personal and that man can come into relations of intimate fellowship with a loving Father. It is these fundamental assertions which a certain school of psychologists now seeks to deny. The hypothesis of God, they assure us, is altogether superfluous. Instead of a God Who is love they offer us a projection of the father-complex; as a substitute for the historical Jesus they confront the Christian with a mythical divine hero, a sort of idealized herd leader; while the consciousness of communion with God in Christ is airily dismissed as a self-generated product of the desire for security and protection.

Mr. Balmforth has produced a painstaking and closely-reasoned reply to these reckless and insufficiently supported contentions. He defines religious experience not as an abnormal 'extra,' but rather as a tone or quality affecting life as a whole. And having noted the several objections brought against the validity of man's claim to be in touch with God, he deals carefully with each in turn. Among such objections he enumerates the bewildering variety of phenomena which can be classed under the general heading of religious experience, the undoubted crimes which have been perpetrated in the name of religion, and most important of all, the

* *Is Christian Experience an Illusion?* By Henry Balmforth, M.A. S.C.M., 1923 Price 4/-. Pp. xiii + 139.

alleged incapacity of the human mind for attaining a trustworthy knowledge of the nature of God.

Much of real value is said about the nature of authority, and the characteristics whereby religious experience which is genuine may be distinguished from its spurious counterpart. While some may contend that the author's sympathy with the psychologists is unduly restricted, he has certainly done good service in pointing out the limitations of the psychological method. For example, he is right in maintaining that whereas all mental processes may justly be thought of as legitimate subjects for investigation, psychology has properly no concern with values, and the old confusion between origin and validity must not be allowed to obtrude itself into any discussion as to the truth or falsehood of Christian experience.

In his final chapter Mr. Balmforth sets out certain definite tests of valid experience, maintaining that a religious faith which may hope to make good its credentials must be logically satisfying, morally fruitful, and of such a character as to enable him who holds it to withstand the major shocks of life by the power inherent in his creed.

The book deserves to be widely read alike for its clearness of thought, its adequate grasp of a difficult subject, and its constructive purpose. There is a good bibliography of psychological works, and an introduction by the Bishop of Manchester.

W. Maurice Pryke.

THE BELIEFS OF PHILOSOPHERS.[1]

'That metaphysics should approve itself to common sense is indeed out of the question. For neither in its processes nor in its results can it expect, or even hope, to be generally intelligible,' wrote the late Mr. F. H. Bradley,[2] who himself had the gift of lucid exposition. A more optimistic view is expressed by Mr. C. D. Broad in the present collection of 'personal statements' by contemporary philosophers:

> 'I believe that what can be said at all can be said simply and clearly in any civilised language or in a suitable system of symbols, and that verbal obscurity is almost always a sign of mental confusion. I agree with Dr. Johnson's remark about Jacob Boehme: "If Jacob saw the unutterable, Jacob should not have attempted to utter it."'

We may take our choice between these two views about the possibility of making metaphysics intelligible to the general public; but Professor Muirhead, in editing the present volume, displays a hope not only that philosophers can make themselves intelligible, but also that they have something useful to impart. It certainly is all to the good if they can; and it is worth while for them to try, for this is the only antidote we know of to some form of superstition—whether the superstition of dogmatic theology or the superstition of dogmatic materialism, which are both alike, as Mr. Bradley has said, 'mutilations of our nature.'

Among the sixteen 'personal statements' composing the present volume, the reader will turn first to the contribution of the late Professor Bosanquet, which has the melancholy interest of being his last published utterance.[3] The most interesting part of this essay is where the Professor

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. (George Allen and Unwin, 16/- net. 1924.)

[2] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 547.

[3] Professor Muirhead unhappily could not induce Mr. Bradley to contribute. In a characteristic letter, published in the Preface, he declined the invitation.

tells how, as a youth, he was induced to go to hear the distinguished preacher, Dr. Moorhouse, afterwards Bishop of Manchester. After discussing some of the current criticisms of the New Testament story, 'the preacher broke forth with extreme emotion: "But what are all these reasonings to me? I *know* that these things are true."' Young Bosanquet's feelings at the time were (1) that the speaker 'evidently had hold of an experience which brought him strength and inspiration'; and (2) that this experience 'could not conceivably be what he seemed to me to identify it with, *viz.* an assurance that certain events in history had actually taken place.'

The fact was that the bishop had got hold of a real experience (or a real experience had got hold of the bishop) which might be identified with the conviction that there exist certain values which are the most real and the most important things in life. But the bishop seemed to his young critic to be wrong in somehow identifying them with the occurrence of certain events *remote in time and alien in quality*: thus placing in the past what ought to lie in the present, and in the 'supernatural' what ought to lie in the natural. This sort of thing, Bosanquet felt, imported a singular unreality into religion, which seemed to be concerned not with present experience so much as with the remote, the unusual, and the inaccessible. It was as if aesthetic values were to be looked for, not *in* the world around us, but either in the remote past, or in some 'supernatural' sphere lying outside our experience. Such an aesthetic theory would not be helpful to art and artistic perception, and such a religious theory is perhaps not helpful to religion. The business of aesthetics is to teach us to see the ideal *in* the real, and religion ought to enable us to see the 'spiritual' *in* the world, and not only 'outside' it.

Another interesting, though very different, statement is that of Mr. C. D. Broad, one of the younger Cambridge philosophers. His attitude is characteristic of the newer generation, for he has approached philosophy from the side of natural science. 'I studied natural science seriously long before I began to make an equally serious study of philosophy.' Characteristic also of this 'scientific' school is its sense of the importance of religion as an element in experience:

> 'There is one thing which Speculative Philosophy must take into most serious consideration, and that is the religious and mystical experiences of mankind. These form a vast mass of facts which obviously deserve at least as careful attention as the sensations of mankind. . . . Any system of Speculative Philosophy which ignores it will be extremely one-sided. In fact, it cannot safely be ignored.'

We may congratulate ourselves on the fact that Mr. Bertrand Russell did not decline to contribute to this *symposium*. His essay is one of the least easy to read, as the relationships of mathematics to logic and metaphysics are hardly susceptible of popular treatment, but Mr. Russell's views on the *rôle* of philosophy seem to deserve full quotation, because, better perhaps than any passage in this volume, they express the modern estimate of metaphysics.

> 'The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis. Philosophy is more concerned than any special science with relations of different sciences and possible conflicts between them; in particular, it cannot acquiesce in a conflict between physics and psychology, or between psychology and logic. Philosophy should be comprehensive, and should be bold in suggesting hypotheses as to the universe which science is not yet in a position to confirm or confute. But these should always be

presented *as* hypotheses, not (as is too often done) as immutable certainties like the dogmas of religion. Although, moreover, comprehensive construction is part of the business of philosophy, I do not believe it to be the most important part. The most important part, to my mind, consists in criticising and clarifying notions which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. As instances I might mention: mind, matter, consciousness, knowledge, experience, causality, will, time. I believe all these notions to be inexact and approximate, essentially infected with vagueness, incapable of forming part of any exact science.'

The Bishop of Manchester's contribution to this collection seems to us valuable not least for a lucid presentation of a point which is very often misunderstood. It is sometimes said that Reason, though efficient enough as an instrument in its own sphere, *i.e.* in the sphere of strictly physical events, is not competent to deal with higher matters, *i.e.* with the ethical, aesthetic, and religious realms. And the conclusion drawn is that understanding in these regions cannot be 'intellectual,' but is rather 'intuitional'; a conclusion which a good many people are ready to grasp at when Reason does not seem disposed to give them all that they want.

But the real reason why the intellect feels most at home in the mathematical sphere, is that here it is dealing, not with concrete reality, but with abstract concepts from which every irreducible element of individuality has been rigorously sifted. We can argue so easily about straight lines and points precisely because we are not arguing about *things,* but about certain deliberately selected aspects of things. But in the case of Aesthetics and Ethics it is not merely that here we are studying a thing like *value,* which involves a relation with an estimating mind, but that the subject matter is too individual and concrete, besides being altogether too extensive to enable us to reach the accuracy which mathematics can achieve.

> 'It is true that the intellect of man never in this earthly life attains the same degree of cogency and precision in these studies [Ethics and Aesthetics] as in mathematics; but this may be only because there is needed an apprehension infinite not only in range and delicacy, but also in sympathy, and (perhaps) an infinite time-span, if all the relevant considerations are to be correlated' (p. 422).

In other words, it is not our intellect, or reason, that is to blame, but our lack of adequate *data.* You cannot reason truly unless you are in possession of all the facts, and it is the facts, or some indispensable portion of them that eludes us.

We have to thank Professor Muirhead for a most interesting and valuable book, which we should like to quote from at further length.

PRACTICAL IDEALISM.*

This book is not, as the rather vociferous title might lead one to suppose, an essay in devout rhetoric, but a collection of historical evidences designed to prove that the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount 'works' wherever people have been enterprising enough to apply its principles.

The first chapter, which is called 'An Unarmed State,' is a plain tale of the Quaker settlers in America under William Penn. The next chapter, 'In Business,' gives us instances of persons whose first concern was not to make money but to serve the community, from the Benedictines whose

* *Christ Triumphant,* by Maude Royden. Putnam, 3/6 net.

motto was *Laborare est orare* to Thomas of Huddersfield and George Cadbury of Birmingham. Another very interesting chapter is devoted to the genius of Henry Ford, whose business policy would appear to have been very similar. In all these cases the object has been service and the result has been wealth. It all sounds a little too good to be true, but we may hope it is true oftener than it sometimes seems to be.

The chapter, 'In our Industrial System,' contains a *catena* of impassioned utterances from public-spirited and patriotic manufacturers who envisaged the ruin of British trade if children of five, six, and seven were released from prolonged and exhausting toil in coal-mines and mills. One laments these good old times; humanitarianism in those days had not gone to extravagant lengths, and business was business.

A chapter on 'The State and the Offender' is similarly instructive. In the reign of Henry VIII, 72,000 persons were executed in this realm; an average of 2,000 a year. Elizabeth Fry is cited in reference to prison life; the lot of the women convicts on the voyage to Botany Bay would have startled even Candide. Yet as the savagery of the punishments has declined, the savagery of the delinquents has diminished.

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that Miss Royden's book is not a mere display of *a priori* idealism; but a most practical and convincing argument for essential Christianity.

J.C.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

JACOB AND ESAU.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

In his reply to your comments on his admirable paper on 'Evolution a Vital Phenomenon,' Dr. MacBride has the following sentence: 'What are we to think of a writer who bases his case [for election] on the old legend of Jacob and Esau, which anthropologists assure us is only a form of a world-wide myth based on the primitive awe of twin-births?' Since this sentence seems to me to contain a quite unfair criticism of St. Paul, and also to expose a very serious weakness in the work of certain anthropologists, I hope that you will allow me to comment upon it at some length.

First of all, then, the anthropologists. No one can for a moment justly deny the vast contributions to knowledge made by the science of anthropology, nor the tremendous zeal and industry of its savants. But we must be on our guard against accepting too readily the theories which they put forth. There is a grave danger that the inexpert may be led astray by them, especially their brother scientists to whom their methods, so orderly and so apparently exact, make a strong appeal. The anthropologist spreads his net very widely, and he seems to regard everything that he finds in it as fish. In other words, his anxiety to discover instances of some particular belief or custom is apt to betray him. A good example of this may be found in connexion with Totemism. Following the lines laid down by Tylor and Robertson Smith, it was common for anthropologists some years ago to find traces of Totemism everywhere, even in remote classical antiquity. Now there has been a re-action, and a cautious scholar like Sir James Frazer, in his great work on the subject, after expressing his doubts whether any such examples could be found, simply

ignores them in the body of his work, and confines his attention to savage people of more recent times.

The truth of the matter is that the superabundant energy of certain anthropologists, combined with a lack of the power of discrimination, has brought their science into contempt among specialists in various historical studies. For since they cannot possibly possess one-tenth of the knowledge of the specialist, they are always liable to be led astray by superficial resemblances, and so to lay themselves open to criticism. I shall not soon forget the remarks of one of the greatest of living classical scholars when I happened to refer to the opinion of an equally great living anthropologist on some point of Roman custom.

Dr. MacBride furnishes us with a further illustration of this defect. His unnamed anthropologists who would dismiss the story of Jacob and Esau as a 'form of a world-wide myth based on the primitive awe of twin-births,' simply make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of any competent student of the Old Testament. It may be that in its far-off beginnings the story was connected with such a myth, but as it stands in the Old Testament, and as it was known to St. Paul and his readers, any such connexion, if it ever existed, had long been lost. Sir James Frazer devotes no less than 138 pages to the story in his 'Folk-Lore in the Old Testament,' not as an instance of twin-birth, but of ultimogeniture. For the anthropologist, as well as for the theologian, its true interest is succession or 'election.'

More briefly as to St. Paul. I do not think it is wise to say that he based his belief in regard to election on the story of Jacob and Esau. A rabbinic thinker, such as was the Apostle to the very end, arrived at his conclusion, and then supported it by illustrations from all possible sources, with an eye to literary effect, it might almost seem, rather than to logical triumph. In the case under discussion, however, the instance chosen was perfectly fitted to serve the purpose of the argument.

Need I remind your readers that St. Paul's use of the story is based on a rather loose quotation of the Septuagint version of Malachi i. 2 *f.* To the Hebrews, Jacob and Esau were not merely individuals, they were the personifications of rival nations, Israel and Edom. History had shewn that Jehovah had chosen the one and exalted it, the other, although descended from the elder brother (I need not stop to go into possible explanations of this in terms of tribal history) had been rejected and debased. A knowledge of contemporary thought, both in its methods and in its content, would shew that St. Paul could not have chosen a more telling or fitting illustration of his argument. (I will not labour this point, since Sanday and Headlam have a long note on it in their commentary on *Romans*.)

L. Elliott Binns.

EVOLUTION A VITAL PHENOMENON.

Sir,

I much regret that you have made so easy a surrender to Professor MacBride on the question of the Pauline doctrine of Election. It may be quite true, as the Professor suggests, that the old legend of the *birth* of Jacob and Esau can be explained away by the anthropologists; but that is by no means the whole of the matter, and such an explanation will not satisfy a theologian. The words of *Gen.* xxv, 23, clearly indicate that in this case, historical fact is anterior to legend and myth.

'Two nations are in thy womb,
And two peoples shall be separated from thy bowels.'

Of those two nations, Israel produced our Lord and His apostles; while Edom produced—Herod the Great! Surely a clear case of election, if ever there was one. When we consider, not the theories of anthropology, but the actual historical facts, we must admit that the words of St. Paul are hardly too strong, and we shall be willing to allow that he knew what he was talking about. W. E. J. LINDFIELD.

[We surrendered to Professor MacBride mainly because it appeared to us on re-examining certain passages in *Romans* (*e.g.* ix, 17-19; 20-24) that the Pauline conception of election and predestination was not only national but also individual.—ED. *M.C.*]

WHAT IS 'THE CHURCH'?

SIR,

What is 'the Church'? Can you or any reader of the *Modern Churchman* answer the question? The words 'the Church' are in constant use. Theologians of all schools and other writers on religious matters use them with reckless freedom. But, except when a Roman Catholic is speaking, I am at a loss to know what they mean.

I have just read Professor Goudge's interesting paper in the November number of the *Modern Churchman*. Professor Goudge admits that 'the Church' once 'taught the infallibility of the letter of Scripture; and in so teaching, taught erroneously'; and he goes on to say: 'We teach to-day nothing of the kind. If the Scripture difficulty was real once, it is not real now.' This is a sweeping statement. By 'we' is meant, I presume, the authorized exponents of the teaching of 'the Church.' But has 'the Church' really repented of its erroneous teaching? The Church of Rome has not. It still insists, as it has always done, on 'the absolute inerrancy of Scripture.' So do the Calvinistic Churches. So (to the best of my knowledge and belief) does the Greek Church. Has the rest of Christendom—supposing it to be unanimous on this point, which it certainly is not—the right to arrogate to itself the title of 'the Church'?

In the same paper Professor Goudge disposes of the opening chapters of *Genesis* in the following words: 'The early Hebrews had their naïve stories of the origin of the world; we find one of them in the second chapter of Genesis. But they took over with docility the views of the Babylonians, who were supposed to understand cosmology; and the first chapter of *Genesis* gives a different account of the creation from that of the second, and a much better one.' Professor Goudge speaks with an air of authority. Is he again expounding the teaching of 'the Church'? It is not the teaching of the Church of Rome, or of any of the Churches which believe in the 'absolute inerrancy of Scripture.' The Church of Rome teaches with no uncertain voice that the early Hebrews got their cosmology, not from Babylon, but from someone to whom it had been directly communicated by God. And, far from regarding the second chapter of *Genesis* as a 'naïve' myth, it insists that the story of the Garden of Eden and the Fall is 'true and literal history,' and adds with refreshing candour that any other hypothesis 'involves the overthrow of the whole Christian revelation, which in numberless ways assumes the truth of the history.' So here, too, the teaching of 'the Church' (as expounded by Professor Goudge) diverges widely from that of the leading Christian Churches.

What, then, is 'the Church'? There are many Christian Churches. Is it one of these? And, if so, which one? Or is it an invisible Church behind all the visible Churches? If it is, has it an articulate voice? And

if it has, who are its authorized exponents, and what does it teach? Or is its voice so inarticulate that anyone who pleases may claim to be its spokesman? These are points on which I ask enlightenment.

E. G. A. HOLMES.

[These questions are plainly for Professor Goudge, not for us.—ED. *M.C.*]

PROFESSOR GOUDGE'S DILEMMA.

SIR,

If you can find space for them, I should like to offer a few remarks on the above subject, raised by Dr. Goudge in his criticisms of Mr. Russell's paper and my own at the Oxford Conference.

He observes that 'it is quite idle to strain out the gnat of Miracle, and swallow the camel of Freedom'—*i.e.* to admit freedom is to admit miracle. This, I know, is the usual argument, but I believe it to be entirely fallacious.

Men of science realise that the admission of organic spontaneity, or freedom, does 'necessitate a definite answer to the central problem of psycho-physics,' *i.e.* the problem as to how 'mind' can influence 'body.' But even assuming that men of science accept the solution 'not most congenial to them' (as do some of them, *e.g.* Driesch and McDougall, who take the view that 'entelechies,' 'psychoids,' or 'souls' move organisms), that does not involve them in a belief in miracle, as understood by St. Thomas. This they would unhesitatingly repudiate.

The fact, if it be a fact, that 'mind' on all its levels from the amoeba up to man, moves 'body,' certainly sets the organic realm apart from the inorganic realm (as Dr. Goudge admits that I allow in my paper where I speak about 'various levels of existence'). But it does not upset the idea of 'natural law,' for there are biological and psychological, just as there are physico-chemical, laws. These instances of organic behaviour or organic spontaneity, as when an amoeba acts differently from an equivalent speck of dead matter, or as when I lift my arm, may be inexplicable from the merely physical standpoint, and can, if you care to condone a misuse of language, be called 'miracles' from that standpoint. But if a piece of normal organic behaviour is to be called a 'miracle,' the new terminology divests the old of all meaning: for from this point of view, *all* births and not only instances of human parthenogenesis are miracles.

Thus, though it does seem to be the case that 'freedom' is somehow inserted into an apparently 'determinist' physical world by means of organisms both high and low (for you cannot dissociate the 'freedom' of man from the 'freedom' of the amoeba—it is only a question of increasing complexity of the 'basis of reaction' to stimulus), yet this, though it may involve the corollary that 'mind' moves 'matter,' does not seem to involve any breaches of natural law (under natural law I, of course, include biological and psychological law).

Most men of science regard the body-mind dualism as untenable; but even the dualism of Bergson, James, Driesch, and McDougall would not involve the superannuated dualism of St. Thomas: or, in other words, the orthodox view of 'miracle,' which distinguishes between natural and supernatural processes or events.

PARTINGTON VICARAGE, J. C. HARDWICK.
November 27, 1924.

[We regret that lack of space prohibits the publication of a number of letters.—ED. *M.C.*]